Florida Law Review
Volume 53

Issue 1

Article 3

January 2001

Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for
Cyberspace
Ruth Okediji

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 Fla. L. Rev.
107 (2001).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol53/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Okediji: Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for

GIVERS, TAKERS, AND OTHER KINDS OF USERS:
A FAIR USE DOCTRINE FOR CYBERSPACE
Ruth Okediji*
....................................

I.

INTRODUCTION

II.

LAND OF THE FREE? CONSTRUCTING FAIR USE
AND PUBUCWELFARE...............................

108

117
A. FairUse Misstated: FairUse at Common Law
118
andIts ContemporaryArticulation ..................
B. DiminishingWelfare: Copyright,the Scope of
124
Derivative Works, and FairUse ....................
C. Reviving FairUse: The Case ofNew Technologies ..... 130
D. Divining FairUse: The Beginnings of Fair
138
Use Principlesfor Cyberspace .....................
Ill.

IV.

V.

THE EFFICACY OF FAm USE iN CYBERSPACE ..............

146

A. FairUse in a Global Medium ......................
B. Localizing FairUse ..............................
1. Between the Rock of Incentives and
the Hard Place of Access .......................
2. Fair Use and Private Ordering ...................

147
152

CONSTRUCTING FAIR USE FOR CYBERSPACE ..............

153

A. (Re)constructingPublic Welfare for Cyberspace .......
1. Copyright Formalities ..........................
2. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy .................
3. Length of Protection ...........................
B. Revisiting Acuff-Rose and Its Progeny ...............
1. The Purpose and Character of the Use or the
Allegedly Infringing Work ......................
2. The Nature of the Medium ......................
3. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion
Used and the Utility of the Underlying Work ........
4. Convert the Market Test to a Measure of Damages ...
C. Lessonsfrom Section 117 of the 1976 CopyrightAct:
Towards an Architecture ..........................

153
155
156
157
161

CONCLUSION ......................................

176

152
153

162
165
166
168
173

Edith Gaylord Harper Presidential Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
I am grateful to Tom Cotter, Peter Kutner, and Mark Lemley for comments on early drafts of this
Article. My wonderful cadre ofresearch assistants: David Jordan, Chris Kirt, Greg Luster, and more
recently, SylviaCardona, ChadMcLawhom, and Sally Garrison--deserve immense thanks for their
invaluable research assistance.
*

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 52

I. INTRODUCTION
If information is not free, it certainly wants, or more aptly, needs to be.

At least, so say a group of technology mavericks intent on using new
technologies to maximize information delivery to the public.' In a world

predominated with users of information technology, this popular sentiment
has significant allure in part because the information age has made a
significant amount of information freely available. In addition, information
technology has empowered ordinary users to become a part of the creative
process both by its interactive nature and the very architecture of the
pennon of the information society, the Internet.2 The controversial Napster
case, 3 questions regarding the legitimacy of caching, and challenges to
linking and framing4 illustrate attempts by owners to control or, at least,

1. See John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy ofMind on the Global
Net, athttp://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/John-Perry-Barlow/HTM-idea-economy-article.html
(last visited Mar. 12, 1999) (crediting Stewart Brand with the statement). But see Tom W. Bell, Fair
Use vs. FaredUse: The ImpactofAutomatedRights Management on Copyright'sFairUse Doctrine,
76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 559 (1998) (Bell argues that information does not want anything unless one
embraces digital animism. Instead, Bell argues, it is people who "want" information to be free.).
2. The recent controversy over the software produced by Napster is an example of
empowerment. Napster is the continuation of the saga of MP3 technology which was the subject
of litigation in 1999. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d
1072, 1073 (9th Cir. 1999). But as Lawrence Lessig expounds, this architecture is not stable,
immutable, or inherently empowering to users. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODEAND OTHER
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). In this Article, I use the terms Internet and Cyberspace
interchangeably. E.g., Trotter Hardy, Property(andCopyright)in Cyberspace,1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 217, 217 (noting that cyberspace is shorthand for all computer communications).
3. On December 6, 1999, A&M Records filed a complaint for copyright infringement
against Napster Inc., the provider of an Internet service that allows users to swap MP3 files, engage
in space shifting (i.e., sharing files between hard drives and players), and sample music. A & M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,900 (N.D. Cal. 2000). On August 10, 2000, the
United States District Court for the Northern District ofCalifornia granted apreliminary injunction
against Napster. Id. at 901. On August 18, 2000, Napster filed a brief seeking to overturn the
preliminary injunction. On Oct. 2, 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
heard the oral arguments. Subsequently in November a settlement was reached with BMG which
said it would drop the suit once Napster implemented a fee-based service that pays royalties. For
a page with links to resource material on the case, including expert reports, see
http:llwww.gseis.ucla.eduliclplnapster.htrm
4. For scholarship critical of a theory of liability for linking, see generally Edward A.
Cavazos & Coe F. Miles, Copyright on the WWW: Linking and Liability, 4 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3,

§V (1997), availableathttp://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v4i2/cavazos.html; David Hayes, Advanced
CopyrightIssues on the Internet, 7 TEX. INTaL-PROP. L.J. 1, 85-88 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, The
Law and Economics ofInternetNorms, 73 CHL-KENT L. REV. 1257 (1998); Maureen O'Rourke,
Toward a PatentFairUse Doctrine, 100 COLuM. L. REV. 1177 (2000); see also Bernstein v. J.C.
Penney, Inc., No. 98-2958 R (Ex), 1998 WL 906644 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1998) (rejecting liability
for linking).
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suppress activity-creative or not-that might dilute the absolute rights
which copyright law arguably confers upon them.
For some time, the debate surrounding copyright law and new
technology primarily centered on the copyrightability of new
technologies-that is, the feasibility of extending copyright protection to
new technologies, such as computer software. Although Congress
ostensibly decided the issue over two decades ago, 5 conceptual questions
still remain and scholarly discourse continues about the viability and
wisdom of extending copyright protection both to new technologies and
the innumerable ways that the technology fosters exploitation of
copyrighted works. The unprecedented growth of the Internet has
intensified the debate and extended it beyond the ivory tower of academe.
As is now commonly acknowledged, the bright-line distinctions that are
characteristic of real space are but shifting boundaries in cyberspace;
determining who is an owner or user of content can be just as complex as
applying traditional copyright standards of infringement to determine when
content has been wrongfully appropriated. Thus, the question of how we
share cyberspace is at the crux of salient scholarly debates and legal
controversies over the application of intellectual property on the Internet.
Copyright owners, understandably, view cyberspace as a threat to well
established proprietary rules and fear a situation where the boundaries of
copyright and trademark regimes will be uncontrollably trespassed by users
in cyberspace. These fears, some would argue, were largely preempted by
the official government response which, so far, has recast traditional
models of regulation in cyberspace with the result that owners' rights have
been unwittingly expanded.6 Congress has also deliberately expanded
owners' rights through recent legislation, most notably the Digital

5. In 1976, Congress created the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU)
to provide the President and Congress with recommendations concerning those
changes necessary in copyright law or procedure needed both to assure public
access to copyrighted works used in conjunction with computer and machine
duplication systems and to respect the rights of owners of copyrights in such
works, while considering the concerns of the general public and the consumer.
United States National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final
Report of The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 1 (1979)
[hereinafter CONTU Report]. The Commission recommended that computer programs should be
treated as a proper subject of copyright and that the 1976 Copyright Act govern databases as well
as copyrighted works fixed in a computer or generated by a computer. Id at 9-43. Congress
subsequently enacted CONTU's recommendations. See Computer Software Copyright Act, Pub.
L. No. 96-517, § 10(b), 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988)).
6. See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29,2934(1994).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 3
FWRIDA LAW REVIEW

[VoL. 52

Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)7 and the Copyright Term Extension
Act (CTEA).' And finally, there is the ubiquitous "code" (software) that
determines, as a threshold matter, the possibility of a user accessing
cyberspace. 9 This code may reinforce or supplant private regimes flowing
from contractual arrangements that define terms of access and/or use of
content.1°
On the other hand, the radical impact of cyberspace on how we think,
act, and interact" offers to many an opportunity to redeem the limitations
of real-space copyright law. Furthermore, Congress ostensibly still desires
to ensure that the public enjoys maximum gains from the range of utilities
made available by the Internet. There has been no express challenge to the
fact that the public interest lies at the heart of copyright and trademark
7. Digital MillenniumCopyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, Title 1,§ 103 (a), 112 Stat. 2863
(1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b) (1998)).
8. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304 (1998)).
9. See Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace,48 STAN. L. REv. 1403, 1408 (1996).
10. In theory the question of protecting new technological mediums is distinct from the issue
of the protection of content hosted by that medium. In cyberspace however, content and technology
can and do become fused (as the invocation of copyright claims to linking and framing indicate)
so that the legal and analytical process of differentiating between the two may yield less than
optimal judicial and legislative responses to regulatory concerns.
11. An estimated 110 million people used the Internet in 1999. American Bar Association
Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project, Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace:A
Report on GlobalJurisdictionIssues Createdby the Internet; TransnationalIssues in Cyberspace:
A Project on the Law Relating to Jurisdiction (London Meeting Draft 2000), at
http:llwww.abanet.orglbuslaw/cyber/initiativesljurisdicition.html [hereinafter ABA Report]. This
estimate is down from the 200 million users anticipated. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850
(1997). Other technology, such as the television or radio, has had profound effects on society.
However, the combined audio, visual, and interactive capability of communications technology
offers a medium in which political, economic, and social interaction is radically effected and
affected. The ABA Report also states that over five million emails per minute are sent worldwide.
ABA Report, supra.There are an estimated 260 million users with Internet access worldwide with
a projected number of 765 million by 2005. Id. Exclusion from the Internet will reinforce the
underprivileged position of poor citizens and exacerbate the economic divide by perpetuating the
growth of a class of ill-equipped citizens. The U.S. government is keenly aware of this and has
devised several initiatives to address concerns of a widening digital gap. For example, the
Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 mandated a plan based on four pillars: making modem
computers and learning devices accessible to every student; connecting classrooms to one another
and to the outside world; making educational software an integral part of the curriculum; and
ensuring that teachers are ready to use and teach with technology. See Improving America's
Schools Act, Pub. L. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (1994); see also United States Department of
Education Technology Home Page, athttp'//www.ed.gov/Technology/goals.html (lastvisited Aug.

4, 1999); United States Department of Commerce, Falling Through the Net: A Survey of "Have
Nots" in UrbanandRuralAmerica(1995), at http:llwww.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahomelfallingthru.html
(last visited Mar. 17, 1999); Rosemary J. Coombe, Left Outon the Information SuperHighway,75
OR. L. REV. 237 (1996) (offering a critique of the dominantly Western dialogue that permeates the
Internet and pointing out how the commodification of culture in the form of intellectual property
rights occludes use of, and access to, information).
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protection, although the above mentioned recent legislative enactmentsboth the process by which they came to fruition as well as their substantive
provisions-give reason to pause.over Congress' commitment to the public
interest or, at the very least, its understanding of the implications of the
expansion of copyright law. 2 Alternatively, one might express this state of
affairs as a manifestation of the legislative capture of Congress by special13
interest groups and the bartering that took place at the bargaining table.
The careful balance between protecting rights of "owners" and ensuring
public benefit by facilitating access to protected works has been the
framework within which the constitutional imperative to "promote the
progress of science and the useful arts" 14 has historically been pursued. The
irony imposed upon this assiduously crafted system of copyright protection
is that the artificial constructs of real space, such as "authorship" and
"copy," which lie at the heart of copyright, must now be deconstructed to

12. Expanded and strengthened intellectual property rights have caused no small
consternation on the part of copyright scholars. In the context of regulating digital technology, the
anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA exert considerable pressure against the public interest.
Julie Cohen, WIPO Treaty Implementation in the United States: Will FairUse Survive?, 21 (5)
EUR. IMELL PROP. REV. 236 (1999) (arguing that the anti-circumvention and anti-device
provisions of the DMCA will likely narrow fairuses); Pamela Samuelson, IntellectualPropertyand
the DigitalEconomy: Why the Anti-CircumventionRegulationsNeed to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 519, 562-64 (1999) (criticizing the unjustifiable overbreadth of the DMCA, Professor
Samuelson argues for a minimalist approach to the anti-circumvention rules and suggests a general
purpose or legitimate purpose exception to preserve an optimal level of user access). With regard
to the general problem of copyright expansion, owners' fears of losing ground in cyberspace or
failing to gain additional rent from the captive audiences that populate cyberspace as well as the
availability of technology that facilitates aggrandizement of royalty or licensing profits, have led
to judicial incursions on the public interest in the form of whittling away at the fair use doctrine.
E.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir. 1996)
(en banc); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 914 (2d Cir. 1994).
13. Copyright scholars have increasingly noted this pervasive pattern of modem copyright
law making and its pernicious effects, both in terms of the eroded ability of ordinary citizens to
understand the law because it is now so complex and voluminous, and because it is a process that
fundamentally produces bad law. Most notable is Professor Jessica Litman's writings on the
legislative process. £g., Jessica D. Litman, CopyrightandInformationPolicy,55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 185 (1992); Jessica D. Litman, CopyrightLegislationand Technological Change,68 OR. L.
REV. 275 (1989); see also Cohen, supra note 12, at 236 (noting that the DMCA is a product of
congressional compromise after a two year battle between copyright industries and consumer groups
over how to implement the WIPO Copyright Treaty); Jane C. Ginsburg, CopyrightLegislationforthe
"DigitalMillennium,"23 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. &ARTS 137, 179 (1999) (reviewing theDMCA and the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act and concluding that while it is an important adaptation
of copyright to digital communications both statutes leave much to be desired by both users and

reflect, interalia,the ills of modem copyright legislative process); Samuelson, supranote 12, at 52324 (noting that the DMCA was a product of compromise between Silicon Valley and Hollywood and
that a fairer compromise between the two and their respective allies would have produced better
legislation).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 8.
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make that same system work in cyberspace.' 5 How to do so is the difficult
task. 16 What is not difficult, however, is that the central objective of
promoting public welfare and the normative principles that have developed
for this purpose remain unchanged.

In this Article, I argue that the underpinnings of the fair use doctrine
have significant utility in facilitating the development of a taxonomy for
determining the rights of providers and users of content in cyberspace. I do

not base my thesis just on the language of the constitutional provision for
copyright laws, but in addition, on the indeterminacy of fair use, which I
assert corresponds most effectively with the evolving and dynamic nature
of cyberspace. It is an argument that at its heart maintains that fair use
ought not be a doctrine frozen in time or space (so that it should apply to

cyberspace as well as real space), but neither should its extension to
cyberspace be limited by the sort of outcomes we have come to expect of
real-space fair use applications.17 Thus, while the argument I pursue

maintains the substance of the current fair use test, with some different
permutations, my overall project is to advance a vision of fair use that

traverses both worlds without subordinating one,to the other.18
Application of the complex fair use doctrine in cyberspace appears, at

first blush, to be an unwieldy and extremely difficult task. The problem of
overlapping copyrights in cyberspace already poses fairly serious

challenges to courts attempting to apply copyright rights to new
technologies. 19 Additionally, since fair use is an explicit tool to serve the
15. Literal applications of these concepts lead to unimaginable numbers of claims for multiple
infringements in cyberspace. See Mark A. Lemley, CopyrightOwners' Rights and Users' Privileges
on the Internet:Dealing with Overlapping Copyrightson the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547,
550-67 (1997) (discussing each of the copyright rights and how Net transmission potentially violates
all or several of these rights at least once and in some cases, more than once).
16. There is a rich body of scholarship on the expansion of copyright and its implication for
the public interest principle that informs the constitutional authority behind copyright legislation.
While there is a degree of variance over the extent individual scholars might venture in arguing
against the current trend, I think it is fair to state that there is some consensus that the expansionist
trend-in both patent law and copyright-is adverse to the stated goals of the intellectual property
system and, in the context of the DMCA, more than is necessary to effectuate international
obligations. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 12; Ginsburg, supra note 13.
17. While fair use outcomes are inherently uncertain, there has been a presumption offair use
in certain cases such as non-commercial private uses, uses that bump against free speech concerns,
and transformative uses. E.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 571 (1994);
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 542 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,456 (1984). My point is that these outcomes should
constitute the outer edges of fair use, not its core.
18. See Lessig, supra note 9, at 1403 (discussing the interaction between both worlds and
possibilities for regulation that reflect the reality that people simultaneously exist in both worlds).
19. E.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543,548 (N.D. Tex. 1997),
affd., 168 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 1999) (direct infringement on a website); Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1383 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (preDMCA indirect and contributory infringement for ISP liability). See generallyLemley, supranote
15, at 550-67 (discussing overlapping copyrights and proposing a solution).
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public interest, its application in cyberspace will shape the boundaries of
property and behavior with regards to online content.2 No controlling
approach to these questions has emerged, although scholars have offered
several propositions.21 With regard to a proforma application of fair use
in cyberspace, the issue is even more involved. The fair use doctrine is
anything but a model of clarity. As Lloyd Weinreb recently reminded us,
at least part of the problem with fair use is that we don't know what it is.22
But we also don't know whatthe Internetwill become. My principal thesis,
then, is that as owners' rights are expanded to respond to the ease with
which digital technology enables large scale infringement, users' rights
should, correspondingly, be reconceived to reflect the variety of ways the
Internet facilitates-indeed encourages-production, access, and use of
copyrighted content. In other words, what ought to weigh principally in the
minds of judges and legislators is not simply how to apply the traditional
norms to cyberspace, but instead, the range of possibilities the Internet
offers to users ought to play a significant role in determining questions
over the allocation of rights in cyberspace. Proposed solutions to users'
rights in cyberspace, such as implied consent (or license), 23 a Net
transmission right,' or technological responses such as rights management
systems,' fail to account for the opportunities the Internet offers to users
and instead focus inordinately on the possibilities for violation of the
traditional rights as a premise for the solutions. Further, some of these
proposals rely on (or at least invoke) market-based analyses which, I argue,
freezes the conception of public interest in time. Market-based evaluations
of interaction in cyberspace tend to be biased against users because the
criterion used to determine infringement in real space often are functional
or technical aspects of just being in cyberspace. Put differently, public
interest tends to be evaluated by the same measurement used prior to the
20. How significant a role fair use may play in this process is subject to a plethora of other
factors which add or detract from fair use at different points, and at times, converging with some

of the objectives that fair use promotes such as free speech. Some factors include Lessig's
arguments regarding code, the interpretation and application of the DMCA, international
agreements on regulation of the Internet, judicial dispositions on issues such as privacy and free
speech, and how much or little government regulation emerges in the near future.
21. See generallyLESSIG, supra note 2; Bell, supra note 1; Lemley, supra note 15.

22. See loyd L. Weinreb, FairUse, 4FORDHAML. REV. 1291, 1291 (1999).
23. Cf. Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990).
24. See Lemley, supra note 15, at 582-84.

25. See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981,981-83 (1996).

26. Uses based on the current technology are also not static and this fact reinforces an
argument for fair use. See infra, Part IV (developing this argument); see also Trotter Hardy,
Computer Ram "Copies":A Hit orA Myth? HistoricalPerspectives on Caching asAmicrocosm
of Current CopyrightConcerns,22 U. DAYTON L. REv. 423,428 (1997) (evaluating caching from

a techno-historical perspective and arguing for a case-by-case determination of whether caching is
infringement either through fair use or an implied license).
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advent of new technology, namely how much rent a copyright owner can
obtain from every possible use of a protected work. Consequently, it is
increasingly the case that when a copyright owner cries "foul" over activity
in cyberspace, there is a predilection to conclude that infringement has
taken place, due in part to the predisposition-well massaged by the
copyright industry-that cyberspace is a place that, by its very nature,
engenders infringing activity. The result is that doctrines designed to
mediate between competing interests are constrained or supplanted by a
variety of methods to protect the way technology makes it easier to collect
rent from users. Regulation of content use in cyberspace in favor of owners
is thus often a reaction to the phenomenon of cyberspace itself.
Commentators have tended to focus on the behavior of users either as
underprivileged citizens due to the expansion of copyright law or as
potential outlaws in the absence of restraints in the form of intellectual
property laws, technological devices, or private contractual arrangements.
Where the principal inquiry has been how to calibrate user rights to
facilitate access and promote the public welfare, the controlling paradigm
has been the standard owner-user tension. However, cyberspace adds an
additional level for this traditional incentive story; in promoting welfare in
a cyberspace context it is notjust the factor of production of creative works
that is important, but incentivizing production in cyberspace. In other
words, how do we encourage the production of works in cyberspace, or
alternatively, encourage creators to put their work in cyberspace. There has
been an assumption that creators will come to cyberspace and so the
primary need is to protect the terms that govern their interaction with users,
there also being an implicit assumption that, with respect to the users, if we
build it they will come. However, prospects for maintaining the copyright
balance must account for the fact that the Internet is a medium. In this
sense, fair use might be viewed as a delivery mechanism of public welfare
goals-a part of the design of cyberspace. I suggest that the fair use doctrine
will be a superior mechanism for safeguarding the public interest in a way
that facilitates dispersion of the new benefits that the Internet offers to
society as a whole. By fair use, I do not refer merely to our current
conception of the doctrine, but rather to the fact that claims of ownership
in creative works are arbitrated and circumscribed by interests that exist
beyond the pecuniary interests of the owner. My goal in this article, then,
is to provide a normative approach to fair use in the distinct economy of
cyberspace.
In Part ILof this Article, I examine the relationship between fair use and
the public welfare goals of copyright law. I undertake a brief history of the
common law fair use doctrine and its modem derivation. This discussion
is central to assertions later in the Article that an efficacious fair use
doctrine in the digital era must be infused with the vitality and dynamism

of its common law antecedents. Originally a judicially created common

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol53/iss1/3

8

Okediji: Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for
FAIR USE DOCTRINEFOR CYBERSPACE

law doctrine, fair use is often described as a principle that mediates
between the exclusive grant to the copyright owner and the public policy
of encouraging the dissemination and use of knowledge for the
advancement of public welfare.27 While I agree with this iteration, I also
argue that to cabin fair use this way is to undermine the variety of ways
that other copyright principles serve the public welfare. In this part then,

I identify the competing visions of welfare implicit in copyright law,
namely access-welfare and use-welfare, and analyze how specific copyright
doctrines promote these welfare norms.
In Part I, I offer several arguments for the efficacy of fair use in
unleashing the redistributive potential of the Internet without unduly
jeopardizing economic benefits to owners. One argument is that fair use
will forestall development of a global anti-commons (under-use of

information)28 or a caste system (privileged use) in cyberspace.29 Stated

differently, fair use will help facilitate use of informational content in
cyberspace by all users. 0 Yet another argument is that fair use is a bulwark
against takers. Contrary to popular opinion, cyberspace is not the land of
the free; there are continuously evolving technological and legal means to
27. In a provocative article, Professor Ray Patterson sets forth the foundations of this
mediating function in relation to free speech. L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair
Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 66 (1987). A concern for balance between public and private interest is
evident in the history of copyright law even absent the fair use doctrine. E.g., Statute of Anne, 8
ANNE ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.) ("an act for the encouragement of learning").
28. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
From Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 668 (1998) (defining anticommons as a resource
under use resulting from multiple owners holding multiple rights of exclusion in a scarce resource).
While I do not suggest that information is a scarce resource, I do propose that it is a resource
vulnerable to under use once propertized. The tendency to under use information is a function of
socioeconomic constraints which determine accessibility to computers. Copyrights are an additional
layer of constraint affecting use-welfare. Those who can barely afford computers will face
additional costs if use is taxed in the form of licenses. In a world of private copyright management
systems, licensing as a standard toll on use of content will create information "castes" who access
and use information on different terms. Economist Joseph Farrell points out that network effects
serve to deter users when the price is above cost, thus reducing the benefit of cyberspace for that
user and for others who can afford the cost of access and use. Joseph Farrell, Argumentsfor
Weaker Intellectual Property Protection in Network Industries, in STANDARDS POICY FOR
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 369 (Brian Kahin & Janet Abbate eds., 1995). Farrell concludes
that a reduction in demand (use of cyberspace) creates more harm when network effects are
important. IkL; see also Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 CAL L. REV. 479, 601-02 (1998). Fair use addresses the potential for
reduction in demand attributed to cost by facilitating use of information notwithstanding
socioeconomic status.
29. See Diane LeenheerZimmerman, Copyright in Cyberspace:Don'tThrow Out the Public
Interestwith the Bath Water, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403,405 (voicing the same concern).
30. See Farell, supra note 28 and accompanying text. There is an important point of
distinction to be made here. The argument is not that fair use will lead to optimal levels of use,

since in principle, fair use generally allows use of portions of protected work rather than the work
in its substantiality or entirety.
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regulate how, and on what terms, use of informational content occurs.3 1 It
is not clear that these private law regimes will promote traditional welfare
norms recognized in other areas of law,32 much less nurture an enlightened,
empowering vision of fair use for cyberspace. This is not to say, however,
that private regimes will not engender any welfare benefits. Rather, the
point is that the traditional conception of welfare that flows from private
regimes is dependent on socioeconomic variables, such as bargaining
power and information asymmetries, that are likely to reinforce and extend
real-space inequalities to cyberspace. In the debate over the merits of fair
use, the issue typically is not that copyright owners do not want users to
access their works; it is the price-both in monetary as well as copyright
principle terms-for such access that is at stake. To the extent that cost is
the issue in this debate between owners and users, the question of fair use
fundamentally and irreversibly is one of resource allocation.
Economic analysis of welfare benefits that flow from private regimes
tend to ignore the fact that intellectual property rights, like other forms of
property, are a form of market intervention, not natural, pre-political
rights.3 In particular, intellectual property rights represent a welfare benefit
by the government to authors and inventors.' Consequently, the claim by
authors or owners to "stronger" copyright rights is not inherently superior
to, or more legitimate than, competing claims of users. To the extent that
copyright law is itself a welfare grant, a form of resource creation, and
distribution, an endogenous mechanism for redistribution is justifiable on
the same grounds, namely public welfare. A meaningful fair use standard
will mediate between givers and takers without necessarily subordinating
the interests of each to the other and without impoverishing the welfare
goals of copyright nor the vision of an enriched public life for citizens in
cyberspace.
31. See Bell, supra note 1, at 587 (arguing that automated rights management offers a

superior market based solution to infringement).
32. See Julie Cohen, Copyrightandthe Jurisprudenceof Self-Help, 13 BERKELEYT1ClH.L.J.
1089, 1128-40 (1998) (discussing how Article 2B's self-help provisions are inconsistent with the

doctrinal foundations ofthe UniformCommercial Code, First Amendmentprinciples, and copyright
policy).

33. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyrightfor FunctionalExpression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149,
1240 (1998) (pointing out that copyright is itself a form of market intervention and not a ".natural"
way of doing things).

34. Congress has never given an absolute monopoly right to copyright owners. Instead, some
rights have been allocated to the copyright owner while other rights have been reserved for users.
See generallyL. RAY PATESON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OFCOPYRIGHT: A LAW

OF USER'S RIGHTS (1991); Jessica D. Litman, Revising CopyrightLawfor the InformationAge, 75
OR. L. REv. 19 (1996) (pointing out that, predictably, the haves are fans of the current model while
the have-notsdesire some other model). Professor Litman intimates that the allocation of rights with

each new technological change often is a function of whose lobbyist succeeds or fails, or
alternatively, benefitting from the 1976 Copyright Act depends on who can afford copyright

counsel and who cannot. Id. at 19-23.
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In Part IV of this Article, I revisit three recent fair use decisions and
reflect on the merits of applying the principles announced by the courts to
cyberspace. I introduce, as a preliminary matter, some articulation of fair
use elements that might be more sensitive to the goals I argue that fair use
should advance in cyberspace. The section sets forth three variants of the
fair use doctrine yielded by the judicial decisions. How each variant is
extended to cyberspace will depend, in part, on the construction of the role
and meaning of "society" in this dynamic medium. 3 5 Finally, the section
analyzes the model of exemptions reflected in section 117 of the Copyright
Act and suggests that exemptions of fundamental practices as they evolve
over time, in addition to a fair use doctrine, are more likely to sustain a
relevant and generous vision of public welfare for the information age.
If. LAND OF THE FREE? CONSTRUCTING FAIR USE AND PUBiC
WELFARE

Copyright envisions use by members of the public. 6 Subject to
statutory guidelines, fair use portentiates public access to, and use of,
protected works without incurring sanctions for infringement.37
Historically, the symbiotic relationship between the general public and
authors of literary and artistic works has been evident through public
patronage of the arts.38 This patronage provided some initial lubrication for
the more explicit copyright bargain; namely that an author would receive
an exclusive right in exchange for the public access to the work. This
constitutional bargain reinforced the overt welfare interest in public access
to protected works. In 1976, the fair use doctrine was codified in revisions
to the Copyright Act ("the Act"). 39 Its new statutory character strengthened
its doctrinal position in the field of copyright, and henceforth, fair use
became the dominant means to preserve a semblance of rights for the
public to a copyrighted work.' In the following section, however, I offer
a different version of this codification story.
35. See generallyLessig, supra note 9.
36. See Loew's Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 174 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Karll v. Curtis
Publ'g. Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) ("the fair use of a copyrighted work.., is not an infringement
of copyright").
38. See generallyPanelDiscussion:Art as a Public Good,9 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. &ARTS. 143
(1985). Neil Netanel has suggested that one of the important functions of copyright in promoting
a democratic society is that it frees authors from dependence on "state subsidy, elite patronage and
cultural hierarchy." Neil Weinstock Netanel, CopyrightandaDemocraticCivil Society, 106 YAE
LJ.283,288 (1996).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
40. See Consumers Union of United States v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1048 (2d.
Cir. 1983); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cit.
1979); H.C. Wainwright & Co. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 418 F. Supp. 620, 624-27 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
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A. FairUse Misstated:FairUse at Common Law and Its
ContemporaryArticulation4 '
Judicial development of the fair use doctrine is best understood by
analyzing the utilities of the allegedly infringing works that were at issue
before the common law courts. The first Copyright Act 42 in the United
States did not explicitly identify welfare principles, such as fair use,
perhaps because the entire copyright system was understood to be a form
of welfare grant.43 American courts nevertheless recognized and applied
the common law fair use doctrine, which was then codified in the 1976.
The framework articulated in Folsom v. Marsh,' which provided the
cornerstone for the doctrine, is what Congress incorporated in the 1976

41. In an insightful article, Professor Patterson discusses the transformation of copyright that
occurred as a result of the codification of common law copyright. See generallyL. Ray Patterson,
Copyright Overextended: A PreliminaryInquiry into the Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair

Competition, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 385 (1992).
42. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
43. See Patterson,supranote 41, at 387-96 (discussing the limited nature of the common law
copyright and how codification inverted this by providing a basis to treat copyright as a property
right). Professor Patterson argues that common law copyright only provided a basis for signaling
ownership, not control. Id. By altering the point of copyright in the 1976 Act through the vehicle
of fixation as a basis for ownership, he argues that Congress in fact supplanted, not codified the
more limited common law scheme. Id. In his often quoted communication with Isaac McPherson,
Thomas Jefferson expressed disquiet at the thought of a property right for inventors:
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral
and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have
been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like
fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any point, and
like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of
confinement or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a
subject ofproperty. Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from
them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but
this may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the society,
without claim or complaint from anybody.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THE COMPLEE JEFFERSON
1011, 1015 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of
Copyright:1,45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 507 (1945) ("The principle of copyright is this. It is a tax on
readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers. The tax is an exceedingly bad one; it is a tax
on one of the most innocent and most salutary of human pleasures.").
44. 9 F. Cas. 342,348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1875) (No. 4901) (identifing five elements of the fair
use defense, including: (a) the nature and objects of the selections made; (b) the quantity and value
of the materials used; (c) the degree to which the use may prejudice the sale of the original work;
(d) the degree to which the use may diminish the profits of the original work; and (e) the degree to
which the use may supersede the objects of the original work).
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Copyright Act.45 This codification, in fact, contracted fair use as it existed
in common law.
The facts in Folsom gave rise to a very specific application of fair use
and did not reflect the fullness of the common law doctrine. In Folsomand
its progeny, fair use arose as a defense to a claim of infringement where the
defendant produced an abridgement of a preexisting work.46 In many
instances, the abridgement served a different market, provided the public
a considerably cheaper product, and involved a supplemental degree of
labor and intellectual skill 4 7 The economic harm to an author's market was
very much at issue in the abridgement cases, so that in Folsom the value
of an abridgement as much as the robustness of the fair use defense was on
trial. In construing Folsom, the later case of Story v. Holcombe,48 also
involving an abridgement, held that "[i]f so much be extracted, that the
article communicates the same knowledge as the original work, it is an
actionable violation of literary property."4 The Holcombe court responded
to the problem by fashioning a testfor abridgements- the specie of works
that raised this particular problem-designed to separate new expressions
from colorful repetition.
On the other hand, the seminal fair use case, Cary v. Kearsely, °
involved facts very different from the abridgement cases. In Cary, an
author alleged infringement when a book written by the defendant provided
readers with the same information as the author's book addressing the
same subject matter.5 The court noted that although some factual subjects
were susceptible to reproduction of the same information, the defendant in
Cary at least made some changes to the author's work. 2 In analyzing the
case, the court did not refer to the elements outlined in Folsom. 3 Instead,
the court addressed the issue of intent (animusfurandi)and determined
that where the purpose of copying was to produce a new intellectual work
rather than masquerade as original what already was available, the
45. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
46. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,205-06
(2d Cir. 1979); see also Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976),

reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5680 ("The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of
the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute....
[C]ourts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.").
47. This was also the contextin which fair use was most frequently upheld as valid in English
precedents. See generally Cary v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B. 1803); Gyles v. Wilcox, 26
Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch. 1740); WMLUAMF. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (1st
ed. 1985).
48. 23 F. Cas. 171 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497).
49. Il at 173.
50. 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B. 1803); see also PATRY, supra note 47, at 5 (identifying Cary

as the first fair use case).
51. Cary, 170 Eng. Rep. at 679-80.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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defendant was free to use the prior protected work.54 Once the court
determined that copying was not illegal per se and that the nature of the
new work merited the use of a preexisting work, the issue before the court
ceased to be a question of infringement. 55 It is possible to attribute the
court's emphasis on exact duplication as a prerequisite for a finding of
infringement, to the absence of widespread use of duplicating technology
and to the state of copyright law which, at the time, granted authors the
exclusive right to copy. However, the court's discussion of fair use
militates against an unequivocal conclusion that the decision is best
explained by the state of art and law; the court found affirmatively that
certain works of authorship may tend more than others to necessitate use
(whether in the purely teleological sense or by incorporating prior work)
of what another author has produced.5 6
Embedded in this form of fair use analysis were the seeds of a fair use
doctrine that could reach through the ages to benefit users who add to the
corpus of intellectual goods by using protected works as a springboard for
greater creativity. 57 The emphasis of common law fair use was to ensure
that new works were introduced to the public. As Cary illustrates, the
question of whether or not infringement is at issue rested on the end
product of the use, not simply on the fact of use itself.5" Similarly, in
another English fair use case, Lewis v. Fullarton,59 the court found that
when the primary labor expended by an alleged infringer is to copy an
author's work, 6° a fair use defense fails. The court, in fashioning an award
for the plaintiff, reinforced the emergent fair use canon: thou shalt not take
another's work and place it in the market as a substitute. Thus, the core
54. Id. The court in Caryseemed to imply that intentional infringement could rise to the level

of a criminal offense. See id. It is in this context that animusfurandiwas raised. Id.
55. Id. The plaintiff in this case eventually consented to a nonsuit. lId

56. SeeWebbv. Powers, 29F. Cas. 511,516-17 (C.C.D. Mass. 1847) (No. 17,323) (holding
that some similarities and uses of prior works, even the copying of some parts, are tolerated for
certain types of books).
57. Contemporary fair use reflects this principle and may protect the incorporation of a
previously protected work in a new creative work. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (holding that the commercial character of a musical parody created by a rap
music group using familiar lyrics from a popular song does not create a presumption against fair
use); Steward v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207,276 (1990) (stating that the fair use doctrine "'permits courts
to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very
creativity which that law is designed to foster") (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc.
v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57,60 (2d Cir. 1980)); see also Sundeman v. Seajay Soc'y, Inc., 142
F.3d 194,203 n.14 (4th Cir. 1998). But this does nothappen often enough. See LydiaPallas Loren,
Redefining the Market FailureApproach to FairUse in an Eraof CopyrightPermissionSystems,

5 J. INTELL PRoP. L. 1, 31 (1997) (distinguishing productive use from transformative use and
criticizing judicial focus on the latter in fair use cases).
58. Cary, 170 Eng. Rep. at 679-80.
59. 2 Beav. 6 (1839) (Eng.).
60. Id. at 9.
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concern of common law copyright was to prohibit misappropriation of a
copyrighted work.
One scholar has suggested that, similar to the element of intent raised
in Cary, the purpose that motivates the use should affect the determination
of whether a work is fairly used. 61 Therefore, a court should consider if the
purpose or effect is to deprive the author of his copyright.62 This
interpretation of animusfurandiis questionable, given the facts in Cary,
and the subsequent context in which intent was at issue in the court's fair
use analysis. Animusfurandi in Cary arose when the author's attorney
posed a question to the court about literal copying of what purported to be
a new work. 63 The court's contention was that the appropriation of the
material must be done "with a view of compiling a useful book, for the
benefit of the public, upon which there has been a totally new
arrangement... .,"The court focused on the different nature of the work:
"[tihat part of the work of one auther[sic] is found in another, is not of
itself piracy, or sufficient to support an action; a man may fairly adopt part
of the work of another.. .forthe promotion ofscience, and the benefit of
thepublic."65 Inother words, the second user in a fair use case must use the
material in a way that results in a totally new arrangement or other added
value in the interest of the public.66
The issue of intent in subsequent cases combines two distinct aspects
of the Cary analysis. In one sense, intent represents the motive of the
alleged infringer and asks whether the intent was to take the most
expedient route and avoid the expense and labor of creativity. 67 In another
sense, intent asks whether the defendant holds a good faith belief that the
appropriated work is free for all. Since the time of Cary, courts have held
that the latter is immaterial; it is the effect of the infringement that
61. See Loyd Weinreb, Fair'sFair:A Comment on the FairUse Doctrine, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1137 (1990); see also PATRY, supra note 47, at 11.

62. PATRY, supra note 47, at 11.
63. The question was asked after Lord Ellenborough made clear that the use of a prior work
to create a new work was permissible. See Cary, 170 Eng. Rep. at 680. The plaintiffs attorney then
asked, "[s]uppose aman took Paley's Philosophy, and copied a whole essay, with observations and
notes, or additions at the end of it, would that be piracy?" Id. The court's response raised animus
furandi,transforming the inquiry from fair use to infringement. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. As Lord Ellenborough stated, "If I adopt the works of contemporary writers, and embody
them into my own, it makes a new work." l
67. Courts have held that copying as a short cut to creativity is not permissible, even when
a new work results. In Lewis v. Fullarton,the court held that "none are entitled to save themselves
trouble and expense by availing themselves, for their own profit, of other men's works still subject
to copyright ...protection." 2 Beav. 6, 8 (1839) (Eng.); see also Coll. Entrance Book Co. v.
Amsco Book Co., 119 F.2d 874, 876 (2d Cit. 1941) (finding unfair use where copying is done to
avoid trouble or expense of independent work).
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matters.6" If good faith has any effect at all, it is negligible.69 Both these
connotations of intent involve a "moral inquiry," yet they are distinct. For
example, a finding of wrongful motive in the former sense has resulted in
a finding of infringement,7" and the presence of wilful infringement may
give rise to a claim of criminal infringement. 7' To claim that fair use
analysis involves both a question of the intent and the creative effort of the
alleged infringer effectively, but unwisely, merges the fair use and fair
abridgement analysis.72 The result is conceptual chaos evident in
contemporary fair use analysis.73
The elements outlined by Justice Story in Folsom arose in the context
of abridged works; a work which by its nature had to utilize a substantial
amount of the prior protected work.74 Consequently, it was inevitable that
the substantiality of the amount copied, coupled with the character of the
"new" work, is what triggered this particular expression of the common
law fair use inquiry. The inchoative codification of the Folsom test in the
1976 Act has manifested itself in the attenuated articulation of public
welfare goals implicit in the fair use doctrine and engendered an unwieldy
set of precedents reflecting the multifaceted character of fair use. This state
of incoherence is not, however, a modem development. Fair use and fair
abridgements had been confused by courts prior and subsequent to Folsom.
Courts often mixed the two, neglecting to determine the nature of the work
in question as a requisite first step towards ascertaining the applicable legal
rules. The opinion in Story observed this tendency of the courts, and

68. Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777,780 (8th Cir. 1962) (holding that lack of intent to infringe
is immaterial); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26,50-51 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136) (same);
Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 175 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497) (same).

69. See PATRY, supra note 47, at 26-32. Some courts have held, however, that intent plays
arole in evaluating the fair use defense. E.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471
U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (holding intent to supplant the copyright holder's right of first publication
cannot be a fair use); N.Y. Tribune v. Otis & Co., 39 F. Supp. 67, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (stating

while defendant's intent to infringe is not essential to a cause of action for infringement, it is
material upon the question of fair use).

70. E.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1245 (3d Cir.
1983) (finding that defendant copied plaintiff's computer program because it was "not feasible" to
write her own); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37,70 (D. Mass 1990).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 506-11 (1994).
72. Patry himself acknowledges this distinction. PATRY, supra note 47, at 13, 18.

73. For example, what is the proper framework for analysis when a user in bad faith
appropriates portions of a work but produces a wholly new product as some might suggest was the
case inAcuff-Rose? See supranote 17; see also PierreN. Leval, Towards a FairUse Standard,103
HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).

74. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). "[A]n
abridgement... contains an epitome of the work abridged and consequently conveys substantially

the same knowledge .... [It] must adopt the arrangement of the work abridged." Story v.
Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 174-75 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497).
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anticipated the exacerbated modem dilemma. In distinguishing between a
compiler and an abridger for example, the court noted that
[the] labor is of a different kind, and of a higher order. It is

therefore important that the works of these two characters
should not be so blended as to place them upon the same

footing: and yet in many of the decisions, no distinction is
made between them. The same facts and reasoning are applied

indiscriminately to both cases; and not infrequently there is
confusion in the argument, which tends more to perplex than
to enlighten the reader.'

While the 1976 Act makes it clear that the codification of the Folsom

elements are illustrative rather than limiting,76 this actually harms, not
helps, the doctrinal coherence of modem fair use.77 The balancing method
is ajuggling act that, in recent times, has resulted less and less in decisions

75. Story, 23 F. Cas. at 175. The court in Story opined that abridgements represented more
intellectual labor and produced something new as opposed to compilations, which simply collected
and reproduced verbatim what another had written. Therefore, the court reasoned that compilations
had a narrower scope of fair use. In the court's analysis, if a compilation affected the value of the
original work, it would be an infringement. For an abridgement, injury alone in the market would
not be sufficient to constitute an infringement. Using the work to produce something else was, in
a sense, per se lawful. Id This conclusion is consistent with Professor Patterson's argument that
common-law copyright premised on publication could not be used to prohibit uses of the work for
other purposes. See Patterson, supra note 41, at 390-91; see also Leval, supra note 73, at 1106-07,
stating that
courts have treated the definition of the doctrine as assumed common ground. The
assumption of common ground is mistaken. Judges do not share a consensus on
the meaning of fair use. Earlier decisions provide little basis for predicting later
ones. Reversals and divided courts are common place. The opinions reflect widely
differing notions of the meaning of fair use. Decisions are not governed by
consistent principles, but seem rather to result from intuitive reactions to
individual act patterns.... Confusion has not been confined to judges. Writers,
historians, publishers, and their legal advisers can only guess and pray as to how
courts will resolve copyright disputes.
Id.; William W. Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659
(1988)(making a similar point).
76. See Notes ofCommittee on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5681 (stating "[t]here may be instances in which copying which does
not fall within the guidelines ... may nonetheless be permitted under the criteria of fair use").
77. It is interesting to note that Congress expected a case-by-case resolution of fair use
disputes. In addition to desiring flexibility, this might have been necessary because, as I argue, the
common law premise was misstated and it was not clear even to Congress that there existed a clear
and settled framework for fair use analysis. Obscurity existed because courts of the day had mixed
the fair use, fair quotation, and fair abridgement cases, making no distinction in their analysis.
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which prioritize the public interest.7" Fair use is often described like
charity-a "privilege" or an "accommodation" to subsequent users as
though they were not contemplated in the welfare vision of copyright

protection.79 The all too familiar (mis)characterization of fair use as a

"privilege," a "right," or "a use technically forbidden by law"80 all indicate
the distance fair use has traveled from its original conception." The

truncated conformation of the concept of fair use, or fair use misstated, has

engendered inconsistency in the set of welfare norms applied by the

courts, 2 and promoted a general sense that the fair use doctrine is unstable,
unreliable, and troublesome. 83 In some regard, however, the "contractionby-codification" of the fair use doctrine was consistent with the significant
expansion of copyright rights reflected in the 1976 Copyright Act,8 thus
setting the stage for the continuous proliferation of rights witnessed
today.85
B. DiminishingWelfare: Copyright, the Scope of
Derivative Works, and FairUse
Consistent with the contraction of public welfare norms, the 1976 Act
extended protection to derivative works.8 6 However, the Copyright Act of
78. E.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996)
(en banc); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
79. This sterile view of users is replicated in copyright law's conception of authorship.
Copyright law views authorship as a single, private act by an author who is unaffected by her
surroundings, her history, her present, or the various interrelationships that undeniably shape her
understanding of the world. I have challenged this view of authorship by contesting the relevance,
and thus, application of copyright principles to societies who recognize authorship as a process of
building community and the result of interactions between the dead and the living, and between the
past and present. See Ruth Gana, Has Creativity Died in The Third World? Some Implications of
the InternationalizationofIntellectualProperty,24 DENv. J. INT'LL. &POL'Y 109 (1995). Several
scholars have also challenged this enlightenment-based view of authorship in the European cultural
milieu. E.g., THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND
LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee &Peter Jaszi eds., 1994); James Boyle, A Theory of Law and
Information: Copyright,Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413 (1992);
Peter Jaszi, Towarda Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphosesof "Authorship,"1991 DUKE L.J.
455.
80. R. DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OFCOPYRIGHT LAw 143 (1925).
81. Loren, supranote 57, at 15.
82. See Pierre N. Leval, Towarda FairUse Standard,103 HARV.L.REV. 1105,1107 (1990).
83. See Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) ("[T]he issue of
fair use.., is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright.").
84. Scholars have suggested that in some ways the 1976 Copyright Actweakened, rather than
strengthened, copyrightprotection; they point to the preemption of state and common law copyright
and any concomitant rights or statutes equivalent to copyright, as well as the codification of the fair
use doctrine. See ROBERTP.MERGESErAL,INTELErUIUALPROPERTYINTHENEWTECHNOLOGICAL

AGE 324 (1997).
85. See Patterson, supra note 41, at 391.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994).
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1909 had previously extended copyright to include the right to make

adaptations and other related works' 7 Any meaningful reconfiguration of
the fair use doctrine will depend on the delineation of the proper scope of
derivative works.
Derivative rights extended the reach of copyright beyond the original

work to the popular subjects of fair use under common law, such as
abridgements8 and compilations. The addition of derivative rights to the
list of exclusive rights granted to authors in particular reinforces the earlier
argument that codification did alter the balance of interests implicit in the

copyright system and, ultimately, contracted the fair use doctrine as
conceived in common law. Put differently, although the codification of fair
use served to ensure its entrenched role in copyright, the right to make

derivative works in fact delimited the scope of common law fair use. The
protection of derivative rights, at least in theory, makes navigation between

87. The 1909 Copyright Act extended copyright protection to include the exclusive right to
"translate... or make any other version thereof, if it be a literary work; to dramatize it if it be a
nondramatic work; to convert it into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange
or adapt it if it be a musical work." Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(b), 35 Stat. 1075. The 1909
Copyright Act also added a public performance right. Id. § 1(d)-(e). It is interesting to note that the
definition of derivative works in the 1976 Copyright Act substantially mirrors section 1of the 1909
Copyright Act. Indeed, the new rights granted under the 1909 Act were introduced in section 101
of the 1976 Copyright Act as examples of derivative works. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also Notes of
Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 57-58 (1976), reprintedin U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5670-71. The 1976 Copyright Act defines a derivative right as the right of the author to
prepare a work based on one or more preexisting works, which may themselves be copyrighted
works. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). Examples include "translations, musical arrangements, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement,
condensation, or any otherform in which a work may be recast,transformedor adapted." Id. at

§ 101 (emphasis added); see also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 259 &n.5 (5th
Cir. 1988). Derivative works are themselves independently copyrightable and the degree of
creativity, like that needed for an original grant of copyright, is minimal. See Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fime Arts, Inc., 191
F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) ("'Original' in reference to a copyrighted work means that the
particular work 'owes its origin' to the 'author.' No large measure of novelty is necessary ....
[N]othing in the Constitution commands that copyrighted matter be strikingly unique or novel.").
The Copyright Act of 1790 had granted authors or other lawful owners of a book, map, or chart the
sole right to publish (printing and reprinting) the work for a period of fourteen years. Copyright Act
of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.
88. An abridgement was defined in one instance as "'an act of understanding, employed in
carrying a large work into a smaller compass, and rendering it less expensive, and more convenient
both to the time and use of the reader which made an abridgement in the nature of a new and a
meritorious work."' PATRY, supra note 47, at 10 n.19 (quoting Strahan v. Newbery, Lofft 775
(1774)). Although it did not agree that an abridgement constitutes fair use of a copyrighted work,
the court in Story v. Holcombe held that to constitute fair use, "[tihere must be real substantial
condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon." 23 F. Cas.
171, 173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497).
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protected rights and works that constitute legitimate uses an onerous
process.89
To constitute a derivative work, the infringing work must incorporate
some portion of the copyrighted work and be substantially similar to the
copyrighted work."° However, this definition of a derivative work is not
helpful for separating the wheat from the chaff in fair use cases. Since fair
use typically involves the incorporation of some portion of a previously
protected work, the merits of a fair use defense will be judged in light of
the right to make a derivative work. This retains a negligible part of a
protected work for others to utilize and privileges certain kinds of use over
others. For example, those uses that intrude on First Amendment freedoms,
such as use of protected material in news reporting, comment, or parody
tend to yield more favorable fair use decisions than creative uses that result
in new products. 91Non-transformative use with diffuse social value is the
least likely to receive protection, and this is precisely the category where
much activity in cyberspace is likely to fall. More importantly,
89. In which case, the scope of fair use would be narrow indeed. Fair use could only be found
if the resulting new work did not amount to a derivative work. Since the list of works under section
106 is not exhaustive, it would be up to the courts to determine the bounds of a derivative work,
particularly where the work does not fall under any of the examples listed. Only where a work is
determined not to be a derivative work, and thus not an infringement of the author's rights, should
the court continue with a fair use inquiry. It is unlikely that courts will be willing to engage in this
sort of divination. Consequently, a finding of infringement of the right to make a derivative work
is more likely to be a court's holding, rather than a finding of fair use.
90. See Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1343-44 (9th Cir.
1988); Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1986).
91. The democratic paradigm of copyright recently advanced by Neil Netanel is nourished,
in part, by these two accepted uses of copyrighted material. See Netanel, supra note 38, at 283-88.
Netanel argues that copyright's fundamental goal is to support a democratic culture. He advances
his democratic paradigm by identifying a production and structural strand of copyright protection.
The production function supports democratic society because it incentivizes creative expression that
enables discourse. The structural function ensures that such discourse is free from the influence of
state and other powerful elite actors so that the value of the discourse is not diminished by the stain
of control. While I agree with the themes evident in Netanel's work, his democratic paradigm fails
to account for power imbalances in civil society that affect the form and content of political
discourse. In this regard, Netanel's article may be categorized as an institutional approach to
copyright. That is, an evaluation of copyright in light of other institutions such as the market, that
undergird most liberal democracies. Il (describing the two dominant approaches to copyright
expansion as neoclassical economics favoring expansion and minimalist critics favoring free uses).
In contrast, this article is focused on the internal order of copyright and how this order tends to
perpetuate imbalances among relationships. This imbalance is not limited to the political process,
but is an economic phenomenon. I argue that the economic impact of the copyright order is what
determines the feasibility of copyright as an agent of democratic growth and as an arbiter between
the haves and the have-nots. Rather than rely on external mechanisms to redistribute resources in
a way that allows for the democratic paradigm Netanel advances, I identify fair use as an internal
mechanism that is consistent with the structural and production functions but that, in addition,

enables economic redistribution and social expression that will, in turn, contribute to a robust civil
society.
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transformative uses that might be protected as fair use may, on the other

hand, also infringe the copyright owner's derivative right. If copyright's
goal is to encourage production, access, and use then it seems self-defeating to preclude another party from engaging in creative expression based
on the first work, while also giving the first author the right to restrict
access to the work. A literal application of the derivative right results in the

evisceration of fair use as conceived in common law. It transforms
infringement analysis by requiring courts to examine the original work and

92
then discern which other works the first author might potentially create,

rather than examining the nature of the use made by the alleged infringer.

Modem fair use has found a semi-comfortable roost in two significant
areas, namely (1) private noncommercial copying93 and (2) copyrighted
material which contains information of public interest.94 Private,

noncommercial copying and public interest information secure components
of public welfare concerns such as the ability to benefit from new
technology. 95 These uses represent activities the government deems
worthwhile enough to supplant the profit and monopoly interests of

authors. While neither ground is an absolute bar to a finding of
infringement, 96 it is well settled that a presumption of fairness attaches to
92. See supranote 87 and accompanying text.
93. E.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,454-55 (1984);
Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
94. E.g., National Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Handgun Control Fed'n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559 (6th
Cir. 1994); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d
Cir. 1983) (finding that scope of fair use doctrine wider where information conveyed relates to

matters of high public concern); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303,307
(2d Cir. 1966) (determining that biographers have wider latitude in utilizing prior works because
of public benefit in the distribution of historical and biographical works); Meeropol v. Nizer, 417
F. Supp. 1201, 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd in part,rev'd in part, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert.denied,434 U.S. 1013 (1978) (stating historical work of espionage trial was of public benefit,
and thus entitled to fair use protection even though devoid of independent research); Time, Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130,146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding fair use in the reproduction
offrames from a copyrighted motion picture film of the assassination of President Kennedy because
of the public interest in having the fulest information available on the assassination); Henry Holt
&Co. v. Liggett &Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp 302,304 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (stating in dicta that
exact words contained in a copyrighted book in a field of science or art can be used by others for
the advancement of such science or art).
95. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
96. E.g., Los Angeles News Sere. v. Tulle, 973 F.2d 791, 798-99 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
fair use did not protect use of copyrighted videotapes of sites of airplane crash and train wreck, and
that commercial character of the use as well as the adverse impact on owner's potential market all
weighed against a finding of fair use); Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 1983)
(finding learning activity package that contained portions of copyrighted material used for nonprofit
educational purpose and distributed to students at no charge did not automatically compel a finding
of fair use); Radji v. Khakbaz, 607 F. Supp. 1296, 1300-01 (D.D.C. 1985) (deciding that a book
or article that describes political orother events of significance is not aperse defense under the fair
use doctrine).
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these uses. 97 Another interesting feature of modem fair use is the strong
presumption against a finding of fair use where a work is unpublished.98

Under a common law fair use analysis, public interest uses would not
fall under the jurisdiction of the fair use doctrine. While both these areas
satisfy some public welfare ideals, they are not, strictly speaking, the
proper subjects of the fair use defense. These particular welfare interests
should be protected under a different doctrinal aegis. 99 An early British
approach provides a useful example. The British Copyright Act of 1911
made several exceptions to the exclusive rights granted to authors."
Specifically, the 1911 Act named the following categories of works and

uses of works as immune from infringement:01 uses for educational
purposes, review, private study, research or news commentary, and
recitations in public of a reasonable extract from any published work or
97. In other words, the scope of fair use is considerably broader where these uses are at issue.
E.g., NationalRifleAss'n, 15 F.3d at 562 (finding that scope of fair use is broader where use relates
to issues of public concern); Diamond v. Am-Law Publ'g. Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984)
(determining, under fair use doctrine, informational works may be more freely published);
Consumers Union, 724 F.2d at 1049 (scope of fair use is broader with respect to informational
work); H.C. Wainwright & Co. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 418 F. Supp. 620, 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (asserting that the doctrine of fair use has been shaped by the courts to assure the public's
access to knowledge of general import, which includes such classic instances of fair use as literary
criticism, parody of the copyrighted work, history, and biography). However, that there is even a
need to isolate uses such as private noncommercial copying and the dissemination of information
of public interest is, again, indicative of how far fair use has broken from its common law roots.
98. See Harper & Row, Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 552-53 (1985). When
a work is unpublished the court rightly is concerned about misappropriation, particularly in a news
reporting context, as was the case in Harper& Row. Id. Yet, employing fair use as a basis for
protecting unpublished works undercuts the purpose and meaning of the doctrine. Who benefits
when a work remains unpublished? Why grant statutory protection if secrecy will be utilized? The
act of "scooping" a story in an attempt to be first to publish it, such as happened in Harper&Row,
ought to be adequately protected under alternative legal theories, such as criminal misappropriation
or invasion of privacy. Id. Indeed, intentional infringement of copyright for financial gain is a
criminal offense. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
99. Other countries such as the United Kingdom address the variety of welfare concerns
differently. For example, the British Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act of 1998 clearly identifies
a set of uses which would constitute fair use ("fair dealing" in British terminology). In addition,
however, the British law recognizes a defense of public interest to protect uses that encourage free
speech. Professor Litman has made a similar argument by suggesting that copyright simply cannot
bear the weight of all the different welfare needs that may implicate or even overlap with the
copyright regime. Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright's Image, 22 U.
DAYTON L REV. 587, 613-18 (1997).

100. The 1911 Copyright Act extended the nature of the copyright grant to include every
original "literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work." Copyright Act, 1911, 1 and 2 Geo. 5, c. 46
(Eng.). The Act also extended the rights of authors to include the right to translate; to convert into
a novel or other non-dramatic work; to convert a nondramatic work into a dramatic work through
public performance; and, "in the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work, to make a record,
perforated roll, cinematographic film or other contrivance by means of which the work may be
mechanically performed or delivered." Id. § 1(a)-(d).
101. These categories remain the standard categories of fair use works. See id. § 2(1).
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publication in a newspaper of a report or lecture delivered in public. 10 2 The
1911 Act made very clear that some amount of the protected work was
freely available to the public to build upon. This had long been the case
before the Act was passed. In Wilkins v. Aikin, 10 3 the court held that
"[tlhere is no doubt, that a man cannot, under the pretence of quotation,
publish either the whole or part of another's work; though he may use...
fair quotation."'" Admitting the difficulty of defining what constitutes a
fair amount, the court held that the test is "whether this is a legitimate use"
of the work, "deserving the character of an original work."'1 5 In another
case, 0 6 the court held that there could be no infringement where the sample
taken from one work and introduced into another is not "substantial and
material."'0 7
The succeeding 1956 British Copyright Act exempted the same
categories of works as the 1911 Act'08 and construed these uses as "general
exceptions" to an author's exclusive right rather than as examples of fair
use. In other words, these uses of copyrighted works were deemed to be
outside the appropriate sphere of the fair use doctrine."' Section 49(1) of
the 1956 British Copyright Act established the general rule regarding the
scope of the author's rights and delineated a threshold requirement that
"the doing of any act in relation to a work or other subject-matter of
copyright" meant or referred to "the doing of an act in relation to a
substantialpart"of the copyrighted work.' By identifying the "floor" of
disapproved uses as a significant reproduction of a protected work, the lens
the 1911 and the 1956 British Copyright
of fair use examination under both
2
Acts was properly adjusted.1
As the cases developed, however, courts departed from the earlier mode

of analysis and more frequently found that infringement had occurred.
These later cases shifted the focus from determining whether a substantial
amount of the protected work had been taken to addressing the competitive
effect or commercial impact of the new work," 3 and the quality of the
102. Id.
103. 17 Ves. 422 (1810) (Eng.).

104. Idat 424.
105. Id. at 425.
106. Chatterton v. Cave, 3 App. Cas. 483 (1878) (Eng.) (considering an alleged violation of
the Dramatic Copyright Act of 1833).
107. Id at 485.

108. Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 2(1) (Eng.).
109. See J.P. EDDY, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 66 (1957).
110. See id.
111. Id. (emphasis added).

112. For many years, the dominant issue faced by courts revolved around what constituted a
at 67.
"substantial" part. See id.

113. See Weatherby &Sons v. Int'l Horse Agency &Exch., Ltd., 102 L.T.R. 856,858 (1910)
(Eng.).
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work taken. 1 4 The analysis rarely centered on the end product or the value
of the alleged infringement' 15 as compared to the protected work. Indeed,
it appeared that by the time of the 1956 Act, 116 a property-oriented
approach to the
subject matter of copyright was firmly entrenched in the
117
courts.
British
In the United States an even stronger, maximalist tradition has recently
dominated the landscape of modem fair use jurisprudence. Uses, for
purposes of criticism or review, are protected to reinforce First
Amendment goals; private, non-commercial use appeals to constitutional
values of privacy and, more cynically, may be deemed analogous to the
concept of harmless error. The underlying rationale for these accepted uses
distinguishes them from other social norms that undergird the desire for
public access to copyright works. Consequently, they should be separately
nurtured for their distinct welfare benefits but not considered fair use
"exceptions," which effectively shrinks the genuine fair use corpus. By
reserving the strongest applications of fair use to activities that do not
result in a specific new product and that do not directly affect the author's
economic interests, the modem fair use doctrine unduly undermines the
potential inherent in copyright for retooling the doctrine to serve a broad
public welfare function that would promote a diversity of uses, means, and
ends." 8
C. Reviving FairUse: The Case of New Technologies
In the context of new technologies, fair use, and the scope of derivative
works has a slightly different permutation. It is clear that the categories of
works listed under section 107 of the 1976 Act are not exceptions from the
114. See Bramwell v. Halcomb, 3 My. & Cr. (Ch.) 737,740 (1836) (Eng.).
115. See Loren, supra note 57, at 27-32.

116. It is interesting to note that the revision of Copyright Law in England became necessary
in view of "technical developments of far reaching importance ... in relation to sound and
television broadcasts, cinematographic films and gramophone records; and these called for
amending legislation." EDDY, supra note 109, at 3. Established in 1951, the Copyright Committee
examined the laws with regard to these developments and gave their recommendation. See id. This

process and the motivation behind it parallels CONTU in the United States. Even more
interestingly, the conclusions of the Copyright Committee were similar to that of the CONTU
Report

117. Either the Copyright Committee did not note the distinction between the 1911 fair use
provision or, as is more likely, chose to rearrange the fair use provision to include as examples of
fair dealing the very same works it had listed as "[gleneral exceptions from protection of literary,

dramatic and musical works." See Copyright Act, 1956,4 &5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, §6 (Eng.). This strange
twist apparently was inadvertent and led to the treatment of exceptions as infringements, thus

implicating fair use. See EDDY, supranote 109, at 66-71 (discussing notes to section 6 of the 1956
British Copyright Act).

118. Butsee Loren, supra note 57, at 30 (criticizing court's emphasis on transformative use
to the exclusion of other productive uses).
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protection given by copyright, but examples of fair use." 9 However,
section 117 is a different matter. The section provides that "it is not an
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or
authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer
program,"' 2 and proceeds to list categories of permitted uses. 2 1 These uses
are outside the scope of the authors' rights unless the activities exceed the
bounds delineated in the 1976 Copyright Act. What is significant is the
legislative incursion on owners' rights to delineate uses that do not, as a
threshold matter, automatically constitute infringement.
The courts have favorably applied the fair use doctrine where the
amount of copying is minimal or where the allegedly infringing work
results in a wholly new product in spite of the fact that the new product in
some way incorporates a portion of the prior protected work. This has been
particularly evident with cases dealing with technology development.
Section 117 of the Act also provides special limitations on exclusive rights
where the complaint involves certain uses of computer programs' 22 In
addition to situations where a copy or adaptation is made as an essential
step in the use of the computer program,12 the section permits use where
a copy is made for archival purposes. 24 The Act makes clear that these two
119. SeeNotesofCommittee on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5678 ("The examples... while by no means not exhaustive, give some
idea of the sort of activities the courts might regard as fair use...: 'quotation of excerpts in a
review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment.").
120. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (1994).
121. Id. § 117(a)(1)-(2).
122. See id. Section 117 (Limitations on exclusive rights: Computer programs), provides, in
relevant part:
(a) Making of additional copy or adaptation by owner of copy. Notwithstanding
the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of
a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or
adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and
that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that
all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of
the computer program should cease to be rightful.
(b) Lease, sale or other transfer of additional copy or adaptation. Any exact copies
prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may be leased, sold, or
otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such copies were prepared,
only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program.
Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of the
copyright owner.
Id.§ 117(a)-(b).
123. Id § 117(a)(1).
124. Id § 117(a)(2).
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uses fall outside the range of infringement; in other words, use for any of
these two purposes is primafacie a valid use of protected work.' 5 Unlike
literary works where the courts have tended to require that infringement
must be disproved regardless of the nature of the use, 26 section 117
precludes the issue of infringement where a computerprogram has been
used in any of the specified ways under the provision. 2 Inexorably, some
courts have construed these uses as examples of fair use. 28
Extending the concept of fair use to statutory exceptions leads to a
circular interpretation of the 1976 Act. If Congress was confident that
application of the fair use doctrine would result in sufficient levels of
public access and use of new technology, surely Congress would have
declined to carve out these specific exceptions. 29 Arguably then, the
creation of statutory exceptions should expandthe scope of acceptable free
uses and impliedly give more room to account for welfare norms rather
than contract the overall allocation of rights between public users and
private owners. Thus, while this particular brand of fair use has
reinvigorated- the access strand of the welfare conundrum and judicial
application of this vein of fair use to new technology has netted some
important welfare results, overall it does not significantly enhance the
promotion of use-welfare, which is a precursor to other1forms
of social,
30
era.
networked
a
in
participation
economic
and
political,
Several cases involving computer programs have also enriched the
31
scope of access-welfare. In Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,1
defendant Accolade argued that disassembly of an object code to gain
125. See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1521 (9th Cir. 1992). "Section

117 defines a narrow category of copying that is lawful per se." Id
126. See Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211,

1217 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding copyright registration shifts burden to defendant to demonstrate
the invalidity of the copyright); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301,306 (2d Cir. 1992); D.C. Comics,
Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that burden is on the defendant to
prove any infringement was innocent).
127. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a).
128. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842-43 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (holding that the fair use exception is the appropriate test for determining the propriety of
decompilation).
129. The CONTU Report suggested that the statutory exceptions created in section 117 were
based on the unique characteristics of computer programs. "Because the placement of a work into
a computer is the preparation of a copy, the law should provide that persons in rightful possession
of copies of programs be able to use them freely without fear of exposure to copyright liability."
CONTU Report, supra note 5, at 13. The report further provided that "because of a lack of
complete standardization among programming languages and hardware in the computer industry,
one who rightfully acquires a copy of a program frequently cannot use it without adapting it to that
limited extent which will allow its use in the possessor's computer." Id
130. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523 ("[W]e... note that we are free to consider the public benefit
resulting from a particular use ....
Public benefit ...may arise because the challenged use serves
a public interest."); see also MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981).
131. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol53/iss1/3

26

Okediji: Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for
20001

FAIR USE DOCTRINE FOR CYBERSPACE

understanding of the ideas and functional concepts embodied constitutes
fair use of the object code."' The court agreed, to some extent, with the
argument and held that disassembly of an object code was considered fair
use where such disassembly presented the only way to gain access to
unprotected aspects of computer programs. 133 Such unprotected aspects
include the ideas and functional elements embodied in the copyrighted
program.13 Notably in Sega, disassembly facilitated both use- and accesswelfare.
In Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo ofAmerica, Inc., 35 Nintendo,
a game cartridge manufacturer, brought a copyright infringement suit
against a company that manufactured a product that enhanced the audiovisual displays of Nintendo games. Nintendo claimed that the product
infringed its right to make derivative works. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court, finding that the product did not infringe the
plaintiff's rights. 36 The court reasoned that the altered displays of the
Nintendo games did not incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in
a concrete or permanent form. 137 Since the allegedly infringing product
could not independently generate the altered displays, the court found that
it was not a derivative work, and thus could not be an infringement. 38 The
court held that "technology often advances by improvement" and "[s]uch
innovations rarely will constitute infringing derivative works under"
copyright. 139 The court also found that even if the allegedly infringing
product was a derivative work, it was a fair use of the protected work.' 4
132. Id. at 1517.

133. Id. at 1520.
134. Id. at 1525-28. Professor Miller has argued against the attempt to distinguish use and

accessibility, because allowing accessibility invariably weakens copyright protection. Arthur R.
Miller, Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs, Databases,and Computer-Generated
Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 988-90, 1026-32 (1993).

Accessibility is also one of the elements for proving infringement. As an evidentiary matter, the
accessibility argument is a double-edged sword. Whatever the merits of allowing access to
unprotected elements of a computer program or software, the fact that accessibility is easier proven
where new technology is concerned would mean that the plaintiff needs to focus primarily on
demonstrating substantial similarity in the two works in order for the court to find infringement.
However, it is the modem version of fair use that renders this effect. Traditional common law fair
use doctrine made this distinction unnecessary because accessibility to certain types of works was
guaranteed. As described earlier, certain uses simply fell outside the scope of copyright, for example
legislative texts. Other uses were immunized from infringement proceedings such as the exceptions
in § 117.
135. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
136. Id at 967.
137. Id. at 968.
138. Id. at 969.
139. Id
140. Id. at 969-72. But see Micro Star v. Formgen, 154 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998)
(overruling Galoob).
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In a recent decision by the Ninth Circuit, Micro Starv. FormgenInc.,41
user-created game levels based on Formgen' s computer game were posted
on the Internet at Formgen's encouragement. 42 Micro Star downloaded
these game levels from the Internet, stamped them onto a CD, and sold
them commercially.1 43 Formgen sued for infringement.1 " In a rather
tortured analysis, the court held that the new game levels constituted a
derivative work, and thus Micro Star was guilty of infringement. 141 In
response to the argument that the game levels were created by users' and
not Formgen, the court distinguished Galoob on two unconvincing
premises. '4 First, the court held that the fair use analysis in reference to the
derivative works arguably created by Game Genie, was unnecessary in
Galoob, and therefore, just dicta. 47 Second, the court held that Galoob
involved a claim of contributory infringement-that Galoob was helping
users create derivative works, while Formgen alleged direct infringement
because the computer files in the CD sold by Micro Star contained new
stories about the protagonist of Formgen's computer game, thus they were
derivative works themselves. 148
Although some commentators suggest that Formgenwas an undoing of
Galoob,the decision appears consistent with the theoretical underpinnings
of fair use and derivative works as applied in Galoob and the common law
fair use doctrine. As discussed earlier, the protection of derivative works
adds tremendous pressure to fair use analysis, particularly in the area of
new technology. In Formgen,the players of the computer game arguably
were given a license to create derivative works both because the computer
game was built specifically to allow the creation of new levels, 14 and
because Formgen encouraged users to post their creations on the
Internet.150 This license, however, did not extend to Micro Star. The court
invoked section 204 of the 1976 Act, which requires transfers of exclusive
rights to be in writing. Because no written agreement existed between
Formgen and Micro Star, the court declined to find that Micro Star was a
beneficiary of the license between the player/authors and Formgen.15 '
The result in Micro Star is curious in several regards. The court's
overall conclusion that the compilation of the user-created game levels
does not qualify as fair use is consistent with the common law fair use
141. 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
142. Id.at 1109.

143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 1113-14.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Micro Star, 154F.3dat 1113.
Id.at 1113.
Id.
See id. at lI09.

150. See id. at 1114.
151. lt
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cases. Micro Star did not add anything of creative value to the computer
game. In this sense, the case is distinguishable from Galoob, where there
was an introduction of a new product to the public. Indeed, all that Micro
Star did was to exploit a market opportunity, which, while not a bad thing
in itself, implicated one of the weightier questions in modem fair use
analysis, namely the use of protected expression made for commercial
purposes."' Thus, the absence of any creative content of its own together
with the presence of commercial exploitation tipped the fair use analysis
against Micro Star. The court concluded that the market for selling usercreated game levels was reserved for Formgen alone.'
While the result in Formgen is defensible, the rationale regarding the
market exploitation is worrisome. It is not clear that Formgen itself was the
legitimate copyright owner to the user-created game levels. Indeed, the
only written license in the case included no language as to ownership of the
game levels, and suggests instead that Formgen did not view itself as the
owner of the new game levels." The court noted that a nonexclusive
license can be oral, but declined to find that Micro Star had a nonexclusive
license, insisting instead that an exclusive license must be in writing.'55
The fact that all Micro Star did was exploit a market opportunity, rather
than engage in creative work, does not mean that it could not plausibly be
exercising rights under an implied nonexclusive license. And if, as the
court found, the users had a license to create derivative works, it should
have made a determination as to who owned the copyright to the new game
levels. In the absence of language to the contrary, the users should own the
copyright to their created levels, thus Formgen should not have been able
to maintain a claim for infringement against Micro Star. In sum, it appears
that the court in Formgen wanted to protect Formgen's market share for its
video game and Formgen's choice to exploit commercial opportunities.
The court did so by latching on to copyright's coattails-and that in a less
than encouraging way.
In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,156 Vault alleged copyright
infringement of a computer program when Quaid attempted to develop its
own software program by copying and deconstructing the Vault
program."' Vault contended that the "copy" violated its exclusive right to
make copies' 58 and its exclusive right to make derivative works. 59 In a
152. See id.
153. Id
154. See id. at 1113.
155. Id.
156. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).

157. Id. at 256. The program Vault developed was a locking device, which functioned to
prevent the unauthorized copying of programs on Vault diskettes. l

158. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994).
159. See id. § 106(2).
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Cary-esque analysis, the circuit court in Vault declined to construe section
117 so narrowly. The court held that, absent clear Congressional intent,

limiting the utilization of programs to uses intended by the owner was not
contemplated by the wording of section 117.16 Moreover, the court found
that the product Quaid eventually developed did not perform the same

function as Vault's software, and thus was not "substantially similar." As
a result, the court held that the Quaid product was not a derivative work.'6'
Finally, in ForesightResources Corp. v. Pfortmiller 62 the court held

that an owner's right to improve or enhance a computer program is not
exclusive. 63 This treatment of new technology, though drawing criticism
from some scholars and courts,' 64 is more consistent with the common law
fair use doctrine. These cases evince three important welfare elements in
the application of fair use, or other exceptions, to new technologies. First,
there is a welfare interest to promote use and access to new works. Usewelfare and access-welfare ensure that the public knows what the new
product is and how it works. The end result is a well informed, better

skilled, and ultimately, improved society.' 65 Second, new technology cases

such as Sega recognize the limitations inherent in the technical framework
of the specific product and that improvements in technology are an
important public welfare concern. Thus, courts have protected such

improvements either independently (for example by limiting the scope of
contributory infringement) or through the fair use doctrine. Finally, the
right to make improvements has emerged, albeit still in its nascent form,

as an important norm in the context of new technological applications.

160. Vault, 847 F.2d at 261.
161. Id. In Midway Mfg. Co. v.Arctic Int'l,Inc., 704F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983), the court held
that the sale of a product which accelerates a computer game is contributory infringement because
the games are derivative works. Id. at 1013. One way to distinguish Vault is that the resulting work
from the infringement did not perform the same function as the originally protected work.
162. 719 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Kan. 1989).
163. Id. at 1010.
164. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37,58 (D. Mass.
1990). Critics of this approach argue that since technology is costly to produce and easy to copy,
allowing others to "stand on the shoulders" of those who preceded them is unfair and creates a
disincentive for pioneering innovation. See Miller, supra note 134, at 1026; see generallyNote,
Towarda UnifiedTheory of CopyrightInfringementforanAdvanced TechnologicalEra,96 HARV.
L. REV. 450 (1982).
165. But see Bell, supranote 1,at 589 (arguing that automated rights management systems will
provide better quality information to users). For a different view grounded in constitutional theory,
see Yochai Benkler, ConstitutionalBounds of DatabaseProtection: The Role of JudicialReview
in the Creationand Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535
(2000); see also Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxyof "Rights
Management,"97MicIL L. REV. 462 (1998) (criticizing economic approaches to rights management
that insist that absolute property rights in cyberspace are the best means of promoting public
welfare).
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While this has been more evident in the patent area,' 66 Pfortmiller is
reflective of this possibility in copyright law.
As the cases discussed above demonstrate, courts have more effectively
and consistently applied the norms of common law fair use to new

technology than the traditional subjects of copyright. It is thus ironic that
in the context of cyberspace, the legislative impulse has been to constrain
users' rights, even though the noneconomic dimensions of Internet use
have, thus far, dominated the medium.' 67 The use of information content
improves cyberspace as a society in its own right. Cyberspace provides a

superior forum for recognizing and affirming the free use of protected
68
works in the interests of free speech or other democratizing mechanisms.

Stronger copyright rights may be a means to encourage further innovation;
but, like the Statute of Anne, fair use should be viewed as a form of
empowerment for the broader society and as a means to facilitate the

diffusion of information Which is an indispensable resource for individual
growth and development in a digital economy. Nowhere is this more
relevant than in the structure of the Internet1 69 The core utility of the

Internet is itself a value to be protected.

166. For an economic analysis of the value of subsequent innovation, see Suzanne Scotchmer,
Cumulative Innovation in Theory andPractice(Feb. 1999) (unpublished article on file with Iowa
Law Review) (discussing the role of subsequent patentable innovations in facilitating efficient
market based allocations of incentives in order to create and thus expand the social value of the
invention). See alsoMark Lemley, The Economic of Improvement in IntellectualPropertyLaw, 75
TEX. L. REv. 989 (1997).
167. Ofcourse, commercial use has been significant as well. See ABA Report supra,note 11,
at 1 (noting retail online commerce is estimated to have reached nearly $15 billion in 1999).
168. SeegenerallyNivaElkin-Koren, CyberlawandSocialChange:A DemocraticApproach
to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215 (1996) (arguing that
cyberspace has profound transformative effects due to its capacity to decentralize production and
disseminate knowledge).
169. A flurry of recent cases have challenged, in part, this structure because of its potential to
bypass copyright owners with ease and to "encourage" multiple copyright violations. See A & M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,900 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Universal City Studios,
Inc., v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D. N.Y. 2000); and 2600 Enterprises Inc. documents
available at http:lleon.law.harvard.edulopenlawlDVD/. The Internet is an international network of
linked computer networks that contains massive collections of information retrievable by anyone
who is linked to the network. The most popular application of the Internet is the World Wide Web.
The World Wide Web is a hypertext system in which documents contain links to other documents
that are located virtually anywhere on the Internet. The World Wide Web allows a user to
instantaneously retrieve information without regard to distance orgeographic boundaries. Users can
make materials available to other individuals on the World Wide Web by linking to a specific
reference. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-53 (1997).
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D. Divining FairUse: The Beginnings of FairUse Principlesfor
Cyberspace
The court's analysis in Story v. Holcombe70 provides a most direct
illustration of how derivative rights push against a robust doctrine of users'
rights. 7 ' According to Story, if a work rests upon a prior protected work,
the primary question is whether or not it simply replicates the substance of
the prior work while not necessarily appropriating its form. If the answer
to this preliminary inquiry is affirmative, then an infringement has
occurred.17 2 In the words of Justice McLean:

The reasoning on which the right to abridge is founded,
therefore, seems to me to be false in fact. It does, to some
extent in all cases... impair the rights of the author.... The
same rule of decision should be applied to a copyright as to a
patent for a machine. The construction of any other machine
which acts upon the same principle, howeverits structure may
be varied, is an infringement on the patent. The second
machine may be recommended by its simplicity and
cheapness; still, if it acts upon the same principle of the one
first patented, the patent is violated. Now an abridgement, if
fairly made, contains the principle of the original work, and
this constitutes its value. Why, then, in reason and justice,
should not the same principle be applied in a case of
copyright as in that of a patented machine?... But a contrary
doctrine has long been established in England... and in this
country.... I am, therefore, bound by precedent; and I yield
to it,... more as a principle of law, than a rule of reason or
justice. 7 3
On the other hand, where a work utilizes part of another to create
something new, under common law and prior to the era of derivative
works, the clear response to an infringement claim would have been
negative.17 4 The conflation of the minimal level of creativity required for
copyright and the extension of copyright protection to editorial revisions,
annotations, elaboration, and other modifications of the work has produced

170. 23 F. Cas. 171 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497).
171. See id. at 173.
172. See id.

173. Id. For cases and literature which refer to fair use as a "rule of reason," see Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,578 (1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417,448 (1984).
174. The nature of the allegedly infringing work is important within this framework. In the
abridgement cases, the matter was intractable simply because the nature of an abridgement was such
that it necessarily "contain[s] the epitome of the work abridged." Story, 23 F. Cas. at 172.
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this "troublesome""17 doctrine. The Story court divined the potential
complexity of the modem fair use doctrine in its observation that earlier
courts failed to make a distinction between abridgements and
compilations. 76 While some aspects of the court's rationale are
debatable, 7 7 the overall opinion is sound. The court suggests that there is

a difference between a work which recreates the substance of a prior work
in a form of expression that "requires labor and the exercise of

judgment,' ' 178 and thus introduces something new to the public; a work

which requires little more than arranging prior works of others into a new
form; and finally, a work which uses a part of another to create a wholly
new work.'7 9 These categories are evident in modem fair use analysis.
The first category used by the Story court is a transformative

work--one which uses some amount of the prior work, but refashions it in
such a way that the final product is fairly different. 80 In such cases, fair use
should be found where the resulting work demonstrates the requisite de
minimis creativity for copyright protection. One could conceivably argue

for a slightly higher standard of creativity. Use of a prior copyrighted work
justifies this higher standard depending on the substantiality of the portion
incorporated into the "new" work. Such a rule preserves the copyright

bargain between the first and subsequent author, and between both authors
and society. It facilitates productive use of copyrighted works and

guarantees that the first author will not additionally tax such use.
The second category represents goods that improve, rather than
transform, the substance of a prior protected work. Such works may also
175. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). In truth, the
troublesome nature of fair use has been evident almost as long as the doctrine has been in existence.
As I argue, the leading cause of confusion has been the refusal of courts to distinguish the kind of
outcomes which have allegedly infringed a protected work. Rather, the threshold question has been
whether or not the accused work to any extent incorporates prior protected work. Since the obvious

answer to this is typically affirmative, the result is that the same principles are used to govern fact
patterns and works as diverse as the range of possible expressions of a single given idea. while the
courts have by and large reached reasonable results, the lack of determinacy in these cases has
resulted in a doctrine that has perplexed more than enlightened the public.
176. Story, 23 F. Cas. at 174. The point the court attempted to make was that different works
based on prior works ought to have differing levels of protection, or at least should be afforded a
different level of analysis in the context of infringement claim.
177. For example, the court finds that because abridgements are of a higher order, they are
more deserving of fair use then compilations. The court's reasoning implies that abridgements
require more intellectual labor than compilations since the latter simply reproduces, verbatim, other
works. See id. at 175. However, copyright law does not make these sorts of value judgments about
the particular work of authorship.
178. Id. at 173.
179. See i&
180. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Sega Enters., Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255

(5th Cir. 1988).
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represent innovation through years of accretion."' 1 Fair use for this sort of
activity requires more rigorous balancing and scrutiny to preserve the
necessary balance of interests. For several reasons, improvements in
copyrighted works that do not add value, either to the work itself or to
society as a whole, should not attract the same level of deference as
transformative works. First, such improvements are heavily subsidized by
the underlying work, and thus protection of such use undercuts welfare
gains to society. There is no introduction of a new work in the sense that
such improvements reflect even less creativity than the de minimis level
required by copyright. Second, protecting such improvements by
subsequent authors has a penalizing effect on first
182 authors and may
adversely affect the incentive structure of copyright.
Generally, courts have not engaged in a product analysis of the
contested use in cases implicating the fair use doctrine. 183 Neither have the
courts, in general, distinguished between what elements of fair use should
be applied to each type of use in order to achieve progress in a particular
science or art, and ultimately enhance public welfare. A framework

adjusting elements of fair use to reflect the contribution of the allegedly
infringing work would be most meaningful for cyberspace and help clarify
the current form of fair use." If, as some courts have suggested, the scope
of a derivative work is any nontrivial variation that would result in added
181. This is particularly the case with add-on software. See generally Richard H. Stem,
Copyright Infringement by Add-On Software: Going Beyond Deconstructionof the Mona Lisa
Moustache Paradigmand Not Taking Video Game Cases Too Seriously, 31 JURIMETRICS J. 205
(1991) (arguing for a narrow scope of protection for improvements on software). Control of such
improvements would not encourage development by subsequent developers, neither would there
be any incentive for the copyright owner to develop it.
182. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
In Lotus, the plaintiff alleged infringement of the Lotus 1-2-3 computer spreadsheet program. See
id. at 42. The court held that the elements of the program were copyrightable. Id at 58. In response
to the defendants' argument about the need to build on "the shoulders of giants," the court found
that "[a]dequate room for innovation remains" to express the idea of a spreadsheet without copying
a prior author's protectable expression. Id. at 77-78. According to the court, this was evident by
other existing spreadsheets in the market, such as Excel. Id. The court also held that the "new" work
represented an incremental improvement on the Lotus spreadsheet, and consequently, it did not
deserve an independent copyright or the benefits of a fair use defense. l at 79. "By... selling a
stand-alone product that completely replaces [the prior work], defendants have not merely...
profited from only their incremental additional expression. Rather, they seek permission to profit
also from copying [the author's] protected expression." Id.
183. See Loren, supranote 57, at 31 (noting that the inquiry in fair use cases unduly focuses
on the transformation of the work rather than on whether the work engendered furtherproductivity).
184. In a sense, the courts are already doing this without saying so explicitly. In various cases,
some elements carry more weight than others. For example, where the purported use is educational,
there is less weight on the "amount and substantiality" of the protected work used. E.g., Holdredge
v. Knight Pub. Corp., 214 F. Supp. 921 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Loew's Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 131 F. Supp.
165 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Thompson v. Gemsback, 94. F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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revenues for the copyright holder,'8 5 does a work really constitute an
originalwork of authorship, particularly where it flows from the same
author? 86 And if not, why permit derivative rights at all, particularly in
cyberspace where nontrivial variations are likely and should be nurtured

given the capabilities of this technology?
Fair use may bring copyright closer or further away from the patent
system, depending on how it is constructed. 8 7 In the framework advocated

in this section, the third category in Story, works of authorship which
utilize a prior work yet are "new" in the teleological or even patent
sense,8 8 brings copyright closer to the kind of analysis employed to

determine whether an invention is sufficiently creative to justify a patent
grant.

9

The reverse doctrine of equivalents" 9 would accomplish, in

theory, similar results as a strong fair use doctrine (and in the absence of
derivative rights) for copyright by requiring that a device that incorporates

a prior patented good be found noninfringing if it is nonobvious with

respect to the earlier invention.' 9' A work based on a prior copyrighted
work need not be radically transformative, but should certainly meet a

higher standard of creativity. Courts have generally been careful to
articulate distinctions between patents and copyrights.'92 However, because
185. See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Arctic Int'l Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir. 1983).
186. Section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act defines a derivative work as "a work based upon
one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a
whole, represent an original work of authorship is a 'derivative work."' 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
187. See Scotchmer, supranote 166, at 3 (noting that recent technological developments have
blurred the lines between copyrightable subject matter and patentable subject matter).
188. I make this distinction because the originality requirement under patent law refers more
to the degree that the "new" invention is different or marks a big jump from prior technology.
189. In Texaslnstruments,Inc. v. UnitedStates Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1986), the court held that improvements which substantially transform existing technology are not
infringing. Id. at 1571-72; see also MERGES, supra note 84 (discussing the doctrine of equivalents
in patent law). This doctrine states that even where an invention differs in form or shape, if it
performs the same work in substantially the same way, it is the "same" as the prior invention, thus
it is not new and fails to meet the novelty requirement ld. Under patent laws, the second innovation
could also fail to qualify for a patent grant because the inventor would not be deemed to be the first
to invent. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(g) (1994).
190. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950).
191. See id.; Atlas Powder Co. v. E.i. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1580-81
(Fed. Cir. 1984); see generally, Lemley supra note 166, at 989.
192. See Synercom Tech., Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1010 (N.D. Tex.
1978). There are numerous philosophical similarities between patents and copyright. These
similarities have made it difficult to resist importing principles from one area to another,however,
historically courts have kept themes ofboth fields separate. E.g., Bakerv. Selden, 101 U.S. 99,10203 (1879). But as this argument suggests, the stronger copyright law becomes, a greater degree of
creativity is required. However, several commentators have acknowledged that with copyright,
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the ultimate objective of each system is synonymous,"' equivalent
principles, properly narrowed to the conceptual differences, can and should
be employed to promote those goals. 194 The protection of derivative rights
is even more problematic in light of this unified objective.
There is some argument that protection of subsequent innovators in
patent law is socially beneficial. 195 Such innovation invariably introduces
a new product variation or new application of the old product to society.
In addition, protection of subsequent innovators facilitates market efficient
transactions by positioning firms to bargain for licensing arrangements, and
thus allows firms to profit from building on each other's inventions.' 96 It
is difficult to make the same arguments for the social benefit of derivative
rights as they are currently articulated.1 97 While it is possible that the lack
of a strong derivative right will discourage certain derivative uses by the
first author, this is unlikely to be a significant deterrence since the
derivative, in theory, requires the same minimal creative input as the
original work and yet will bear an independent copyright status. It is more
likely that the derivative uses that might be deterred are those uses by
others with minimal transformative or "creative" input, such as a
translation or an adaptation, uses that simply exploit new technology, or
that recast the work in a new medium. For such uses, the relevant
analytical point of reference then should not be the derivative right, but the
exclusive right to copy which typically applies even when trivial changes
have been made to a protected work. In sum, the exclusive right to copy is
strong enough to protect the rights of the first author against
misappropriation. With regard to new works that are based on the first
author's work, should copyright law really be concerned about who
under-protection is preferred to over-protection. See Frank W. Lloyd & Daniel M. Mayeda,
CopyrightFairUse, The FirstAmendment, andNew CommunicationsTechnologies: The Impact
of Betamax,38 FED. COMM. L.J. 59 (1986); Note, ComputerIntellectualPropertyand Conceptual
Severance, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1046, 1047 (1990); Note, The Copyrightability of Nonliteral
Elements of Computer Programs,94 COLUM. L. REv. 242 (1994) (arguing for a modified Altai

test).
193. See U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 8 (applying to both authors and inventors); see also notes

accompanying preamble to Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
194. Justice McLean makes this same point in Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171,173 (C.C.D.

Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497). Professor O'Rourke has recently advocated the need for a patent fair use
doctrine for similar reasons. See Maureen O'Rourke, TowardaDoctrineofFairUse in PatentLaw,
100 CoLUM. L. REv. 1177 (2000).
195. See Scotchmer, supra note 166, at 10-16 (discussing economic models of cumulative
innovation and some corresponding benefits); see also Lemley, supra note 166.
196. See Scotchmer, supra note 166, at 10-16; see also Merges & Nelson, On the Complex

Economics ofPatentScope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990) (arguing for the use of doctrines such as
the reverse doctrine of equivalents to prevent dominant patent holders from deterring subsequent

radical innovation).
197. Some scholars have argued that a strong derivative right provides an incentive to authors
to create works that can be adapted to different media. See Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and
DerivativeWorks in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT. Soc'Y 209 (1983).
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introduces this work into the market? The goals of copyright are not
furthered when anyone, including a copyright owner, is granted exclusive
rights to make works that do not exhibit originality or any transformative
elements. They add nothing to society's store of knowledge."' 8 If the work
is not original, creative, different, or transformative enough to warrant a
finding of fair use, it should not qualify for an independent derivativeright.
Further, to the extent that derivative rights are extended to cyberspace, the
level of originality for the derivative work should be higher vis-d-vis the
copyright owner since derivative works are almost unavoidably created by
the most common forms of interaction in cyberspace. To claim a derivative
right in cyberspace, a copyright owner ought to establish that the work in
question is far removed from the scope of use that constitutes a reasonable,
constitutive feature of on-line interaction or that is a result of the design of
the Internet. A weak derivative right, or the absence of such a right, in fact,
may lead to a stronger copyright system and provide creative tributaries to
the public domain by raising the required level of creativity for copyright
protection in second generation works. A heightened creativity requirement
may also expand the public domain in regard to first generation works by
rendering entire works, or portions thereof, as unprotectable subject
matter.' 99
In view of Cary and its progeny, it is intriguing that the recently enacted
No Electronic Theft (NET) Act' reinvigorated the role of intent in
copyright law by criminalizing the posting of copyrighted materials on the
2
Intemet.WI
The NET Act prohibits the electronic reproduction or
distribution of copyrighted works whether or not such acts were done for
198. This is not to argue that a copyright in a book should not extend to a movie works or the
works to produce a mini-series based on the play or story. But these works really are not derivative
in any sense other than that the right, not the work itself, is derived from the original grant if the
level of creativity for second generation works de minimus, the right to copy should extend to
protect these works. If, however, a greater level of creativity is required a new copyright state
should be recognized in those works.
199. There is, however, an argument that works with low levels of creativity are desirable and
socially beneficial and there is a need to provide incentives for their production. The heightened
standard of creativity that I propose would be limited to works based on or utilizing protected
material.
200. No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).
201. Section 2(b) of the NET Act provides:
(b) Criminal Infringement.-Any person who infringes a copyright willfully
either(1) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, or
(2) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any
180-day period, of I or more copies or phonorecords or 1 or more copyrighted
works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000, shall be punished as
provided under section 2319 of title 18, United States Code.
Id. § 2(b).
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commercial advantage or private gain.202 Since the NET Act amends the
1976 Copyright Act, it is presumable that fair use is an available defense.
If this is the case, the NET Act is troubling because fair use is treated
initially as an infringement until the fairuse is proven. Consequently, the
NET Act codifies, and thus legitimizes, the perception that fair use is,
indeed, no more than "an accommodation to the public." 23 The NET Act
has other troubling implications for cyberspace. Because the Internet is a
global communications medium, is storing copyrighted works on a
computer from which a surfer may retrieve it considered a "distribution?"
Further, is accessing the information considered a "reproduction?" The
implications of an affirmative response are clear. ° ' Most common uses of
Internet technology, including methods of interaction such as forwarding
e-mail, involve a level of what is now viewed as "infringement."' 5 If fair
use is not available for typical cyberspace activity, copyright will not
promote the maximum use of new technology, nor facilitate any new
welfare goals. 206 Additionally, without a viable defense to the NET Act,
users in the United States are also criminals. 2 7

Not only does the NET Act potentially affect use and development of
communications technology, it also constrains the growth of information.
Internet applications such as the World Wide Web depend on, and are
valuable because of, hypertext linkages. Challenge to the practice of
linking as a matter for copyright law first arose in the United Kingdom. In
ShetlandTimes v. Wills," a newspaper offered hypertext links to its rival's
stories, using the latter's own headlines.3 The Shetland Times obtained a
preliminary injunction against this practice.210 The court held that the
Internet is a cable broadcast system for the purposes of copyright law, and
consequently, the inclusion of Shetland Times' headlines in the form of a
hypertext link constituted prima facie copyright infringement.2
Ultimately, the parties settled out of court. Three subsequent cases in the

202. Il
203. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, No. 00 Civ. 0277 (Lak), 2000 WL 1160678,
at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2000). See generally Note, The Criminalization of Copyright
Infringement in the DigitalEra, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1705 (1999).
204. See Lemley, supra note 15, at 550-63.

205. Id.
206. See Netanel, supranote 38, at 295-97;see also Farrell,supranote 28 and accompanying

text.
207. The NET Act disproportionally taxes American users and disadvantages them relative to
other users in cyberspace by adding criminal liabilities to the prospects of civil damages.

208. 1997 Sess. Cas. 316 (Scot.).
209. See id.

210. Id.
211. Id.
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United States raised similar issues. 212 Two of the cases settled out of
2 13

court.

Several scholars have already argued against the extension of copyright
to hypertext linkages.2 14 Under the common law fair use cases, hypertext
linkages would be protected for several reasons. First, the function of the
hypertext link itself represents a work of creativity.2 5 Thus, a hypertext
link could be viewed as building on a previous copyrighted work. Second,
use of a hypertext link engenders a "new" work of authorship because it
provides users with a map of information which is what the Internet is
about. Hypertext linkages facilitate public welfare by providing direction
and access to the referenced work. Finally, as mentioned earlier, the use of
the Internet and all the enabling technological accoutermentsconstitute the
value added to the public 216 and the medium to harness, enjoy, and participate in that value. Rules which prevent the full utilization of communications technology ultimately undermine the objectives of copyright. In
cyberspace, the right to make derivative works significantly limits intentional creative activity since any change to a protected work could constitute a derivative. For example, activity such as editing and forwarding
e-mail or newspaper articles would be impermissible. Yet, this activity has
become a standard feature of interaction in cyberspace and has, for the
most part, enhanced its utility to the public while diffusing content broadly.
Hypertext linkages may be protected either as a matter of trademark law
or copyright law.217 For the former, the doctrine of fair use could in theory,
be sed to occlude claims of infringement for hypertext links. In this
212. See Futuredontics, Inc. v. Applied Anagramics, Inc., 152 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 1998);
Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 20, 1997),
availableat http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dlip/washcomp.html (last visited Aug. 28, 1999)

(settled before trial); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 97-3055 DDP (C.D. Cal. filed
May 9,1997), available at http.//legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dlip/tickcomp.html (last visited Aug.

28, 1999) (same).
213. See Emily Madoff, Freedom to Link UnderAttack- Web Community Up in Arms Over
Lawsuits, 217 N.Y.L.J., June 23, 1997, at S1.
214. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, ProprietaryRights in Hypertext Linkages, 1998 J. INIO. L. &
TEcH. 2, §3, athttp:llelj.warwick.ac.ukjiltrintprop/98-2burkl(lastvisitedAug. 28,1999);seealso
supra note 5.
215. See ild
216. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information
Superhighway, The CaseAgainst CopyrightLiability of Bulletin Board Operators,13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L. J. 345, 467 (1995) (discussing how copyright liability against bulletin board
operators undermines social dialogue and suppresses valuable content).
217. See generallyMaureen O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: DrawingBorders in a Virtual
World, 82 MINN. L REV. 609 (1998). There are also First Amendment concerns that have been
raised in the context of linking. See Amicus BriefofOpenlaw Participants in Support of Defendants
Eric Corley, a.k.a. Emmanuel Goldstein, and 2600 Enterprises, at 26-28, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) arguing that hyperlinks are core elements of expression on the web at
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/ micus.html.
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regard, a legislative rule that exempts hypertext links from infringement is
likely to be preferable to the fair use doctrine. In general, I would propose
that uses that are dependent on, or the result of, how the Internet functions,
what I call its framework, should receive a statutory exemption. However,
statutory exemptions should not swallow the fair use doctrine, nor should
they replace it. This will require that courts return to the common law
antecedents outlined earlier so that statutory exemptions enlarge the corpus
of users' rights, rather than shrink them. For nonframework related aspects
of use in cyberspace, the fair use doctrine provides the malleability
necessary to evaluate, and if necessary, accommodate practices in
cyberspace that are not now forseeable. 218 As an explicit welfare rule, the
fair use doctrine's inexactness is precisely what is needed to facilitate
innovative uses of content in cyberspace.
It has proven difficult to apply the fair use doctrine uniformly and keep
it consistent with the overall goal of copyright without acknowledging the
welfare effect of the end uses that reflect the core utilities of a particular
copyrighted product.2 1 9 A viable fair use scheme must rest upon a set of
assumptions rooted in the desire not to discourage anyone'screativity. The
attempt to fit every possible and potential use of a protected work under the
aegis of copyright, or other regimes, will prove imprudent and selfdefeating in a world that offers new opportunities for both a more equitable
redistribution and inequitable accumulation of resources. 220
III. THE EFFICACY OF FAIR USE INCYBERSPACE
The emphasis of common law fair use was not to impede the
introduction of new works to the public, while also protecting the prior
work from misappropriation. A work which reproduced a prior work "only
to colour publication of the original" constituted an infringement. 22 1 As
Cary illustrates, the question of whether infringement was at issue rested
218. One scholar suggests that a possible approach to the problem of multiple-copyrights in
cyberspace is to create a unitary Net transmission right which the copyright owner may license.
Lemley, supranote 15, at 582-84.
219. Unlike the way copyright licensing currently works, such a unitary right would not be
divisible so that once permission to transmit on the Net is granted, incidental replication that occurs
in the course of ordinary computer use, such as RAM copies, will not be actionable. See id.
220. The Net right proposal is at odds with the fair use doctrine, primarily because such a right
again presumes that owners can and should control every possible avenue and medium in which
their works may be used. Because the fair use principle rests on the exact opposite assumptionthat copyright is an interest that is circumscribed by other concerns--the Net right, in principle, is
problematic. To the extent that such a right emerges as a means to deal with the problem of
overlapping copyrights, its application should be limited to circumstances that clearly indicate that
the issue is one of unintentional replication without any creativity. In other words, a Net right
should not be used to circumvent fair uses or to mediate between fair use and the creation of
derivative works.
221. Cary v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680 (K.B. 1803).
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on the end product of the use, not simply on the fact of use itself.222 The
dominant vision of progress in intellectual property literature is, however,
223
measured in terms of production of works, and not use of such works.
This vision is unnecessarily lean and cannot sustain the multiple uses and
functions that cyberspace represents to broader society. Cyberspace is both
private and public space; it is both commercial and noncommercial; it is
a world of global interaction through the World Wide Web with
community creation and identification made possible by listservs or oneon-one interaction via e-mail. Cyberspace is whatever each person can
imagine it to be (subject of course to the limitations of private order, law,
and code). As such, it is a world fraught with endless possibilities and
danger. Why is fair use a vibrant navigating tool for this environment?
Scholarship regarding the taxonomy of cyberspace has focused on some
areas of concern: (1) the effect of expanding copyright rights; (2) the
increased tension between owners and users and the resulting pressure on
the copyright balance; (3) the social engineering implicit in which rules of
governance, private or public, or some blend of both, are legitimated in
cyberspace. This part will examine the utility of fair use in addressing these
concerns starting with an overview of the international implications of fair
use in this medium.
A. FairUse in a Global Medium
At the international level, fair use most significantly affects the
reproduction right of a copyrighted work.' With the growing volume and
significance of international trade to global economic welfare, fair use also
becomes relevant where a work is used as a springboard for newer products. There are a myriad of paradigms in which this could take placejoint ventures, strategic alliances, and other forms of transnational business
relationships based on technological advantage. Additionally, the
possibility of new works created outside the United States, but which
embody protected work of American authors, looms greater than ever in
cyberspace. The legislative focus so far has been on protecting intellectual
property across national boundaries, while ostensibly promoting a domestic
welfare agenda.2' A variety of legal mechanisms, largely based on treaty
222. See id.
223. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 38. But see Benkler, supranote 165, at 569-74 (discussing
the meaning of "progress" in the constitutional clause authorizing copyright laws). Professor
Benider goes beyond this production centered view of progress. See Benkler, supra note 165, at

571-72.
224. See STEPHEN STEWART, INTERNATIONALCOPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 73 (2d

ed. 1989).
225. See PamelaSamuelson, The U.S. DigitalAgendaat WIPO,37 VA.J.INT'LL. 369,371-73
(1997) (detailing the marketing of the principal tenets of the NII White Paper at the 1996 World
Intellectual Property diplomatic conference for a Berne Protocol).
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provisions, exist to provide a framework for international intellectual
property protection. However, none of these frameworks adequately

address the issue of fair use, at least not in its American conformation.
How should fair use be employed in a world of authors and users without
borders?

Copyright protection across national boundaries is governed by a
multiplicity of treaties, both bilateral and multilateral. The most significant
multilateral treaty for copyright protection resulted from the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.226 With

regard to international norms for regulating copyright in cyberspace, the
two recent WIPO Treaties have established a framework to regulate
protection of content on-line. Although the preamble to the WIPO

Copyright Treaty (WCT) makes reference to "the need to maintain a
balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest,"'227 the
provisions providing for limitations and exceptions to the rights provided
mirror the language of the Berne Convention. 228 While the concept of fair

use is not explicitly referred to in the Berne Convention, most countries
had limitations to the exclusive rights granted by copyright prior to the

Berne Convention. 22' The express limitations imposed by the Berne
Convention reflect common concerns shared by member countries and
protected to varying degrees by different national laws. In addition to these
226. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 (1899) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
227. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996 S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (hereinafter WCT);
see also WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOc. No. 105-17
(1996).
228. See WCT art. 10.
(1) Contracting Parties may, in their national legislation, provide for limitations
ofor exceptions to the rights granted to authors of literary and artistic works under
this Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation
of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author.
(2) Contracting Parties shall, when applying the Berne Convention, confine any
limitations of or exceptions to rights provided for therein to certain special cases
that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.
229. The reproduction right, which is the most fundamental right, was only explicitly
recognized in the Stockholm and Paris Acts of the Beme Convention. There was little agreement
between member states as to the scope and content of this right. See SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE
CONVENTIONFORTHEPROTECrIONOFL~rERARYANDARTISTICWORxS: 1886-1986, at369-70,479
(1987). Because the original scope of the right at the national level merely related to exact literal
copies, it followed that others could make use of portions of the work for other purposes. See
generallyRuth Okediji, Towards an InternationalFairUse Doctrine,39(1) COLUM. J. OF TRANS.
L. (forthcoming Dec. 2000).
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explicit expressions, the Berne Convention provided a general principle
permitting countries to provide limitations to copyright protection, thus
providing flexibility for individual member states to adopt fair use type
legislation. Like its national counterparts, the underlying sentiment in
enacting various limitations to exclusive rights in the Berne Convention
was the concern that "'limits to absolute protection are rightly set by the
public interest' ... the fact that copyright protection exists at... [the]

international level is an express recognition of the strong public interest
' 230
that there is in the promotion of cultural, social and economic progress.
Articles 10 and l0bis of the Berne Convention provide for "typical"
modem fair use exceptions, namely, "free use" for quotations, illustrations,
teaching, and news reporting231 However, the basic approach to the
categories of work listed under Article 10 and l0bis respectively indicates
a different approach altogether from American fair use analysis and seems
more similar to British fair use analysis under the 1911 and 1956 British
Copyright Acts. 3 2 The use of works for these purposes assumes a certain
amount of "immunity" from copyright infringement suits. 233These uses are
protected because "there is a public interest present ...

that justifies

overriding the private rights of authors... in these... circumstances."
Put differently, a primafacie case of infringement involving these uses
would include establishing that the accused use is not a quotation,
illustration, work for teaching, or news reporting.
Another sense in which "fair use" can be said to exist in the Berne
Convention is in the provisions of Article 9(2).3 5 Under this provision,
national legislation may in "special cases" authorize the reproduction of
protected works where "such reproduction does not conflict with [the]
normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the author."" 6 The legislative history behind this
provision of the Berne Convention suggests that the "interests" envisaged
are primarily economic.3 7 A more expansive reading would infer that
special cases include at least those recognized by members of the Berne
Convention at the time of their accession. 238 The rights secured for authors
230. Id.at 477.

231. Berne Convention, supra note 226, art. (10)2, 10bis(1).
232. See supra Part II. A.
233. RICKETSON, supra note 229, at 478.
234. Iad

235. See Berne Convention, supranote 226, art. 9(2). Butsee Okediji, supranote 229 (arguing
that the U.S. fair use doctrine is inconsistent with Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention and Article 13
of the TRIPS Agreement).
236. Id.
237. PJCKETSON, supra note 229, at 483-84.
238. Ricketson, in his eminent account of the history of the Berne Convention, indicates that

the meaning of this phrase is unclear. The right to reproduction, it was felt, would be impaired once
exceptions were established. The only qualifier, therefore, was to insist that the use of an author's
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are (1) the exclusive right to reproduction of their works; 2 9 (2) the
exclusive right to perform their work in public;' (3) the exclusive right to
broadcast, rebroadcast, or otherwise communicate their work to the
public;2'" (4) the exclusive right to adapt, arrange, or otherwise alter their
work;' 2 and (5) the exclusive right to public recitation of their work. 3
Since fair use necessarily involves reproducing some part of the protected
work, article 9(2) is currently the analogous provision for fair use under the
Berne Convention. A liberal interpretation of this provision suggests that,
so long as the reproduction has no impact on the authors' economic
expectations, 2 " acountry may authorize free reproduction of a copyrighted
work. So, for example, home recording for private use should be
permissible under the Berne Convention. 2 5 On closer inspection, the
practical application of article 9(2) only seems to be a restatement of the
market impact test enunciated through U.S. case law. However, the
question of what constitutes the author's economic expectations may skew
this analysis. Expectations are no more than legal entitlements. In the
United States, the doctrine of fair use should be invoked as an element in
determining an authors' legitimate expectations such that they could not
reasonably "expect" compensation for every possible use of the
copyrighted work. 24'6 In European countries, where copyright protection is
justified in reference to ideals of liberty and personhood, there are fewer
limitations on authors' rights and, more strikingly, a philosophical
presumption that minimal exceptions are appropriate. Consequently, an
workunder art. 9(2) "not unreasonably prejudice... the interests of the author." Berne Convention,
supra note 226, art. 9(2). This explanation still does not shed light on what those "interests" are.
See RICKETSON, supra note 229, at 482-85.
239. Berne Convention, supra note 226, art. 9.
240. Id. art. 11(l)(i).
241. Id. art. llbis (1)(i)-(1)(iii).
242. l art. 12.
243. Id. art. liter (l)(i). The Berne Convention also recognizes moral rights, which consist
of: (i) the right to decide whether the work will be made public (not recognized by the Berne
Convention); and, (ii) the right of paternity which is made up of (a) the right to demand that the
authors name appear on the work, and for the author to claim authorship at all times, (b) the right
of the author to prevent the use of his/her name in connection with another person's work, and, (c)
the right to prevent others from claiming authorship of the work. Id. art. 6bis; see also STEWART,
supra note 224, at 73.
244. The critical issue would then be how to define the legitimate scope of the author's
expectations. This would in turn depend on the criteria used to define the applicable "market" for
the author's work. For example, would the market be geographically defined? Would it cross
national boundaries? Should it include the market for derivative works?
245. See RICKETSON, supra note 229, at 485. The Supreme Court held as much in the Sony
decision. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) ("A
challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof... that the particular use
is harmful.... What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that some
meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.... [Tihe likelihood must be demonstrated.").
246. But see American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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author's economic expectation is bound to encompass an expectation of
monetized value derived from each instance of use.
The Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) represents the second most
significant multilateral treaty for the protection of copyright across
international boundaries. 7 The UCC is much less important since the
advent of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS Agreement).2 8 Nevertheless, it provides some useful
background on the prospects for a global fair use doctrine. Like the Berne
Convention, the UCC is based on the principle of national treatment,
requiring that each member state treat authors and works of another
member state no worse than it treats its own nationals and their works. 249
However, UCC provisions more directly address fair use by targeting the
three major rights granted under copyright: reproduction, public
performance, and broadcasting.' Article IVbis requires only that the
exceptions to the exclusive rights of the authors "not conflict with the spirit
and provisions" of the UCC and that the exceptions "accord a reasonable
degree of effective protection to each of the rights." 1 While the UCC's
level of protection is lower, 2 it does provide a more relevant framework
for modem fair use analysis in the United States, in that its flexibility
allows the balancing that necessarily takes place in contemporary fair use
cases without sacrificing effective protection. Notwithstanding the UCC
or Berne Convention, no international treaty specifically addresses the
question of what an international fair use doctrine might look like.2 3
Since no international fair use standard currently exists, for now the
question of fair use in cyberspace, as with fair use in real space, will be a
matter for national legislation and the domestic courts charged with its
application.254 Indeed, the agreed statement concerning article 10 of the
247. See Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341 art. 11 [herinafter

UCC].
248. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,1994,
33 I.L.M. 83.
249. See id.
250. See id. Under the Berne Convention, fair use may legitimately limit the public
performance right, and the broadcasting right. Berne Convention, supranote 226, art. Xbis (1)-(2).
251. UCC, supra note 247, art. IVbis (2).

252. See id.
253. SeegenerallyOkediji,supranote229(proposing an international framework forevaluating
fair use).
254. See RICKETSON, supra note 229, at 896; see also Berne Convention, supra note 226, at
art. 9-10. Fair use, under the international conventions, has a much narrower character and

envisages a much different framework for operation. It focuses primarily on the purpose of the use.
The Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement appear to resist any attempt to expand the

concept of fair use to include the use of protected works to create new works. The issue offairuse
under international treaties may thus be framed as concerningfree accessibility, rather than free use.
Undoubtedly, the next round of international negotiations over intellectual property must grapple
with competing visions of individuality, creativity, and the public good.
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WCT recognizes the legitimacy of extending existing and future
exceptions to the digital environment.2 55
B. Localizing FairUse
1. Between the Rock of Incentives and the Hard Place of Access
Copyright scholarship illustrates a fractious divide separating "high
protectionists" and "low protectionists," such as Trotter Hardy's "strong"
versus "less strong" copyrights 756 Neil Netanel's "neoclassical
economists" and "minimalist critics, '257 and Julie Cohen's
cybereconomists 58 and the rise of cyberrealists. The debate wrestles with
the question of how best to maintain effective incentives to create
copyrighted works without diminishing public access to such works and,
consequently, devaluing welfare concerns underlying copyright. 9 The fair
use doctrine is an important bridge across this divide. Fair use
simultaneously protects the incentives to create new works while
protecting the public's right of access. Infringement cases where the fair
use doctrine is raised have to account for the amount and substantiality of
the protected work that was appropriated by the user.
If the fear of the digital age has impelled and justified a rise in
technological and contract-based protections, fair use must be made
stronger to counterbalance this trend. It ensures that the boundaries of the
copyright grant are traversed only as envisaged by the notion of progress.
It offers protection for authors even as it yields to rightful demands of
authorship. Even a reluctant acknowledgment of the utilitarian philosophy
behind American intellectual property must concede that authors are
entitled only to what the law deems necessary to accomplish particular
ends. As deployed from case to case, fair use vigilantly upholds the twin
ends of the debate and forces a constant evaluation of each goal to ensure
its nurturing as the work is accessed by takers and users. Fair use prevents
255. See Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/96. It is understood that the provisions of article 10 permit Contracting Parties to carry
forward and appropriately extend into the digital environment limitations and exceptions in their
national laws which have been considered acceptable under the Berne Convention. Similarly, these
provisions should be understood to permit Contracting Parties to devise new exceptions and
limitations that are appropriate in the digital network environment. It is also understood that article
10(2) neither reduces nor extends the scope of applicability of the limitations and exceptions
permitted by the Berne Convention. See id.
256. Hardy, supra note 2, at 234.
257. Netanel, supra note 38, at 286-87.
258. Cohen, supra note 12, generally.
259. For an insightful critique of the dominance of the incentive-access paradigm in copyright
law, see Glyn S. Lunney, Re-examining CopyrightsIncentives-Access Paradigm,49 VAND. L.REV.
483 (1996).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol53/iss1/3

46

Okediji: Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for
FAIR USE DOCTRINEFOR CYBERSPACE

free misappropriation and does not need to be supplanted by a regime of
fared use.
2. Fair Use and Private Ordering
An expansive fair use doctrine portends value for interactive media in
various ways. This is due in part to the diversity of citizens that are able to
participate in this medium. To the extent that private ordering through
contract or technological mechanisms disproportionately impacts those of
a lower socioeconomic class or those with inferior bargaining power (as is
the case with diffuse users) by keeping them at the gates of cyberspace,
private ordering perpetuates existing power structures, reincarnating and
broadening existing forms of exclusion in society. I have argued that
throughout its history, fair use has been the indispensable and indisputable
guardian of public welfare. In the current schematic of exponential
increases to copyright rights, fair use offers an opportunity to expand
public access, and thus promote a variety of public welfare values.2' 6 Even
without the specter of technological enforcement mechanisms or
preemption by contract, fair use will still need reexamination for its
efficacy in cyberspace.
IV. CONSTRUCTING FAIR USE FOR CYBERSPACE
A. (Re)constructingPublic Welfare for Cyberspace
Given the socioeconomic and political pressures on the intellectual
property system, it is not surprising that an examination of the prevailing
perspectives and judicial approaches to fair use reveal deep divisions and
fundamentally different assumptions about the nature of copyright and the
most effective means of encouraging creativity. The most significant
benefits of a copyright grant include the economic gain of a monopoly rent
and the dissemination of information to the public.26 ' Some historical
260. In a thought provoking article, Professor Fisher articulates two possible models of a

reconstructed fair use. Fisher, supra note 75, at 1659. First, he proposes a model that would
increase efficiency in the use of resources. Id. Second, he suggests the deliberative use of copyright

law to advance a substantive vision of the ideal society. See id. But see Lunney, supranote 259, at
653-56 identifying allocative efficiency rather than incentives-access balance as the better guide to
determining the appropriate scope of copyright protection.
261. Both copyright and patent laws share the underlying philosophy of promoting social
welfare. As early as 1615, British courts recognized the legality of patents for inventions on the
theory that it contributed to public welfare and the inventor ought to be compensated for it. In the
case of the Tailors of Ipswich, the court held that:
If a man hath made a new discovery of anything, in such cases the king of his
grace and favor in recompense ofhis costs and travail may grant by charter to unto
him that he shall only use such a trade or trafique for a certain time because at
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accounts of the fair use doctrine question the extent and nature of the role

of public interest in the development of fair use in copyright. 262 Others

have looked at fair use potentiated access as a function of producing new
works.263 In other words, some scholars view the question of public welfare
as a function of ensuring production of works so the public can access the
protected works. 26 This interpretation of copyright history tells only half
the story.2 65 Fair use is not so much about the production of new
works-the copyright grant took care of that problem by providing
incentives to create. Rather, fair use should be viewed as a necessary
condition for the generation of new forms of expression and new works by
other authors. Stated differently, fair use is, among other things, an
instrument of inclusion. In cyberspace, these "new" works should not be
limited to transformative reproductions. Instead, merely the fact of use is
a significant value. New "works" could thus be skills gained by surfing the
net, acquaintances made in the course of a chat room encounter, or ideas
shared in the context of a listserve. Each interaction in cyberspace is
meaningful for the multitude of interests that are cognizable under welfare
norms.
The tension between public interest and incentive theory is often
viewed as a conflict requiring resolution one way or the other. While
conceding the inextricability of the two welfares, 266 it is a misstatement to
maintain that one must succeed over the other, or that one will, or must be
sacrificed for the other. In fact, these competing welfares complement each
other.2 67 Some elements of copyright protection serve to illustrate the
variety of doctrinal tools that have served to preserve a balance between
the competing welfare interests of the author and the public.268

first, the people of the kingdom are ignorant and have not the knowledge and skill
to use it.

77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B. 1614).
262. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 47, at 55 (describing fair use as an "accommodation" that
became a privilege, rather than a "right" which exists side by side with the copyright grant).
263. This is a common articulation of the access/progress criteriain copyright scholarship. See,
e.g., Netanel, supra note 38.

264. This is a common articulation of the access/progress criteria. See id.; Cohen, supranote
165.
265. For an explanation of the historical use copyright protection as a means of press control,
and later as a means of countering monopoly and censorship, see Patterson, supranote 27, at 21-33,
and text accompanying note 27.
266. As one court succinctly stated, "[w]e cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in

which the public can be checkmated." Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675,679 (1st
Cir. 1967) (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)).

267. See Netanel, supra note 38 (making the same claim).
268. See Litman, supra note 99 (raising this argument).
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1. Copyright Formalities
Early English decisions refused to grant a patent unless disclosure of
the invention was made. Similarly, in the early history of copyright law,
copyright was granted only to authors that fulfilled certain formal

requirements. For example, under the Statute of Anne, a person could not
be found liable "for or by reason of the printing or reprinting of... books"

unless "the title to the copy of such book... shall, before such publication,
be entred[sic] in the register book.... ,,269 Early American copyright acts
also had a similar requirement. 2 0 The registration of title requirement for
copyright and the disclosure requirement for patents performed central
roles in the actual grant of the right itself
because these "formalities"
27

facilitated access to the protected works. '

For patents, the disclosure was required to ensure that the public would
benefit from, and have access to, the invention. In Househill Co. v.
Neilson,272 the court held that "[h]e is not called the inventor who has in his

closet invented it but does not communicate it; the first person who
discloses that invention to the public is considered as the inventor though

another may have invented it and concealed it."273 Thus, registration of title
in copyright and filing for a patent served similar functions. Other
copyright requirements, such as fixation, also facilitate the access-welfare
objectives of copyright. Examined from a welfare perspective, one can

reasonably conclude that the formalities attendant to copyright protection
were more than purely administrative requirements. The historic
269. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
270. See Act of May31, 1790, ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 124; Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 9,
12, 35 Stat. 1075; 17 U.S.C §§ 401,407 (1998).
271. For one thing, registration of title communicated the existence of a literary work; the
deposit requirement provided a source for the public to access the work. It is interesting that only
the United States had a registration requirement. I would argue that these "formalities" were
consistent with the dominant utilitarian philosophy of intellectual property. Registration, in
particular, informs the public what literary works exist in the market place, facilitating, among other
things, research. After accession to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works in 1989, the United States abandoned the mandatory registration requirement in order to
comply with the Berne Convention requirement of no formalities. See Berne Convention, supra
note 226, art. 5(2); see also Jane C. Ginsburg & John M. Kemochan, One hundredand Two Years
Later: The U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, 13 CoLuM.-VLA J.L.& ARTS 1, 19-20 (1988)
(advising registration for non-U.S. works). There is still aregistration requirement for United States
works as a prerequisite for filing an infringement suit and collecting statutory damages. In addition,
two copies of the work must be deposited with the Library of Congress. See 17 U.S.C. § 407
(1998). The deposit requirement is separate requirement and unlike registration, does not affect the
validity of the copyright. Failure to deposit may, however, give rise to a small fine. See id.
272. THOMAS WEBSTER, REPORT & NOTES OF CASES ON LETtERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS
(1601-1843) 719.
273. Id. The modem articulation of this is found in the Patent Code, 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)
(1998). Under this provision, one who has concealed an invention is not entitled to claim priority
under the first to invent rule.
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requirement of compliance with certain formalities prior to the grant of
copyright makes clear that the copyright grant was not conceived as an
absolute, unregulable right.
2. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
The idea/expression dichotomy is tone of the fundamental tenets of
copyright law and marks the primary distinction between copyright and
patents. Copyright protects the expression of ideas and not the ideas
themselves. 74 This simple formulation belies the complexity (and
confusion) this dichotomy has presented in copyright's fertile history. The
articulation of the principle is found in the momentous case of Baker v.
Selden, -5 and codified in section 102(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act. 6
Unlike the patent system, which recognizes only the first inventor,
copyright permits several authors to claim protection for their version of
the same story. 7 7 It is improbable that two authors could produce, word for
word, the same piece of literature or art, musical composition, or computer
program. The inexact nature and infinite variety of human expression
makes possible the grant of copyright to as many as qualify, even if the
information being communicated is the same. Therefore, while "copyright
provides a financial incentive to those who would add to the corpus of
existing knowledge by creating original works," 278 nevertheless, "the
fundamental policy undergirding the copyright laws [is] the encouragement
of contributions to recorded knowledge. 2 79 The idea/expression dichotomy
promotes use welfare by circumscribing the scope of protectable subject
matter. Facts and other basic tools are excluded from protection with the
explicit concern of preserving a core set of resources for other authors.280
274. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).

275. Il at 104 ("The copyright of a book on book-keeping cannot secure the exclusive right
to make, sell, and use account-books prepared upon the plan set forth in such book.").
276. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,

principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.").
277. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 978-80 (2d Cir. 1980).

278. Id. at 974.
279. Id. at 980.

280. Recently, the Federal Circuit held that methods of doing business are patentable,
invalidating a longstanding judicial doctrine that served to limit the scope of patentable subject

matter. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 S. Ct. 851 (1999). Like copyright, the scope of patent law has been
extendedto subject matter previously regarded as unpatentable, with some subjects such as software

eligible both for copyright and patent protection. Indeed one court has stated explicitly that
"virtually anything is patentable." Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1384, 1385 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (Clevenger, J., dissenting); see also Scotchmer, supranote 166, at 3 (observing that
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In addition, the idea/expression dichotomy serves the public interest by
maintaining an equilibrium between patents, trade secrets, and other forms
of protection. However, the expanded scope of patentable subject matter281

and its increasing overlap with copyrightable subject matter represents a
threat to the public welfare. It does so by intruding and taking from the

commons what historically was protected from such intrusion by the
statutory boundaries that define patentability and copyrightability. Put
differently, the greater the scope of patent protection, the less meaningful
the idea/expression dichotomy is for preserving a public domain of freely

accessible works under the copyright regime. Similarly, contract regimes,
such as proposed Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(UCITA), to the extent that they purport to facilitate the reach of copyright
to previously uncopyrightable subject matter282 or seek to secure rights for

authors not granted by the 1976 Copyright Act,2 3 impermissibly shrink the
commons and marginalize public welfare concerns.

3. Length of Protection
The Constitution empowers Congress to grant authors, for limited

times, the exclusive rights to their works. 2" Limited terms serve to ensure

that protected works lapse into the public domain where they may be used
freely in their entirety by others285 which aids public welfare. 286 The first
Copyright Act granted copyright protection for fourteen years.287 Since
blurring between copyright and patent protection has led to successful and unsuccessful attempts
to enact new forms of protection, and expand old ones).
281. See supra note 280 and accompanying text; see also Robert Merges, As Many as Six
Impossible PatentsBefore Breakfast: PropertyRightsfor Business Concepts and PatentSystem
Reform, 14 BERKIEY TECH. L.J. 577, 578 (1999).
282. See Jessica Litman, The Tales ThatArticle2B Tells, 13 BERKELEYTEC. L.J.931 (1998).
283. See id. at 934-35; see also Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy
of IntellectualPropertyLicensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 128-33 (1999).
284. U.S. CONSTr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
285. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (holding that
"[t]he limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly ... reflects a balance of
competing claims upon the public interest"). See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-120 (1998)
(establishing limited terms).
286. See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at7 (1909) (commenting on Copyright Act of 1909, cl. 320,
§§ 50, 57, 35 Stat. 1075) ('hisenactment of copyright legislation by Congress is not based upon
any natural right that the author has in his writings... but upon the ground that the welfare of the
public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to
authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings."); see also Stephen Fraser, The

Conflict Between the FirstAmendment and Copyright Law and Its Impact on the Internet, 16
CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 12 (1998); Lloyd Weinreb, Copyrightfor FunctionalExpression,

11 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1214(1998) (arguing that the enactment of copyright legislation was not
based on any natural rights of the other, but on "the ground that the welfare of the public will be
served" (citing H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7)).

287. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §1, 1 Stat. 124.
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then, Congress has extended the term of copyright protection thirteen
times. 8 Most recent, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 2 9
(CTEA) extended copyright protection from life of the author plus fifty
years to life of the author plus seventy years. 290This recent term extension
prompted a lawsuit 9' alleging the CTEA violates the "limited terms"
provision of article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution. 92 Also, the
complaint alleges that the retroactive extension of the copyright term
adversely affects the public domain and, consequently, is a violation of the
public trust doctrine. 293
It is unclear whether constitutional challenges to copyright term
extensions are tenable; as the complaint acknowledges, any term short of
perpetuity could conceivably pass scrutiny as a "limited term., 294 The

tension between author incentives and the public interest is not an
"either/or" proposition.295 Rather, these two "interests" are constitutive
288. Act of February 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat.
1075; 1962 Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 87-668,76 Stat. 555; Act of Aug. 28,1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-142, 79 Stat. 581; Act of Nov. 16, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-141, 81 Stat. 464; Act of
July23,1968, Pub. L. No. 90-416,82 Stat. 397; Act of Dec. 16, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-147,83 Stat.
360; Act of Dec. 17, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-555, 84 Stat. 1441; Act of Nov. 24, 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-170, 85 Stat. 490; Act of Oct. 25, 1972, Pub. L. 92-566, 86 Stat. 1181; Act of Dec. 31, 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873; Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2573; Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1998).
289. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827, § 102(b) (codified as 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1998)).
290. Id.
291. Complaint, Eldred v. Reno, No. CA 99-0065 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 1999), available at
http:llcyber.law.harvard.eduleldredvreno/complaint-orig.html. The plaintiff, Eldritch Press, is a
non-profit unincorporated association. See id. In 1995, the Eldritch Press was founded by Eric
Eldred in order to demonstrate how computers could be used to present books over the Internet in
new ways and in ways that improved upon books in printed form. See id. Scholars have also
increasingly turned to constitutional theory in search of limits to Congress' power in the area of
intellectual property. See, e.g., Robert Patrick Merges &Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The ProperScope
of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J.ON LEGIS. 45 (2000); Mark Lemley, The
Constitutionalizationof TechnologyLaw, 15 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 529 (2000) (commenting on this
trend).

292. See id.
293. See id. 34-36, 38-40.
294. See id.
34.
295. It is misleading to argue that a tension exists between fair use and exclusive rights unless
one can say the same about statutory exceptions and exclusive rights. Clearly, certain uses, such as
photocopying, do create tension between exclusive rights and public welfare. These uses are outside
of the scope of what this paper argues is the proper conception of fair use. However, treating these
non-fair uses of copyrighted work under the general rubric of fair use engenders confusion.
Contemporary fair use doctrine is wrongly used as a tool to accomplish the desirable balance
between authors or owners of copyright and the public. This requires that fair use take into account
both aspects of the public welfare, where welfare is defined as both accessibility and use. This view
of the fair use doctrine involves a utility for the doctrine beyond market failure or as a default rule
to legitimize an activity for which no specific exemption exists. Instead, fair use ought to be
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elements of the concept of public welfare. The argument that it is the
promise of "reward to the author or artist that serves to induce release to
the public of the products of his creative genius" 296 is no longer
incontestable.2 97 The number of works of authorship available on the
Internet for over 100 million users suggests that there are indeed alternate
motivating factors behind creativity and release of works to the public.298
This is not an argument to decry the legitimacy of pecuniary
gain-payment to the author is also a matter of fairness. 299 However,
undercutting public interest goals by expanding author incentives, without
any evidence of a concomitant benefit or advantage to the public, will not
yield the social benefits requisite for progress; clearly another layer of
barriers is not an encouragement to use information." ° And, after all, the
point of the information revolution is to promote, rather than hinder or
make costlier, a greater flow of knowledge.
It is ironic that there is such great inclination toward high protectionism
in intellectual property when knowledge and information are infinite and
its acquisition is easier than it has ever been. In truth, however, knowledge
frequently is not discovered, but rediscovered (or repackaged) and
articulated in specific techno-legal, sociopolitical, and economic milieus.
In Whelan v. Jaslow DentalLaboratories,the court stated that "copyright
law has always recognized and tried to accommodate the fact that all
intellectual pioneers build on the work of their predecessors.""3 ' This
contention "has long been a virtually unchallenged premise in all branches
of the law of intellectual property. 30 2 The history of technological progress
teaches that what is "new" is often the product of accumulated knowledge.
This fact is favorably regarded as economically efficient 3 --yet another
employed only where the balance between authors and users is skewed; that is, where protection

would serve to hinder creativity of the first or subsequent creator. Thus, fair use should not be in
question where substantial copying may have occurred but such copying has produced a new
intellectual good.
296. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
297. See generally Margaret Chon, New Wine Bursting from Old Bottles, Collaborative
Internet Art, Joint Works, and Entrepreneurship,75 OR. L. REv. 257 (1996) (describing the

evolution of mass authorship engendered by Internet technology which facilitates collaborative
work and creates a new type of access to protected works).
298. See generally Amy Harmon, The Rebel Code, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1999, § 6, at 34.
(discussing the Linux operating system and the ideology behind its free availability on the Internet).
299. See Polygram Int'l Publ'g v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1319-20 (D. Mass.
1994).
300. See Chafee, supra note 43, at 507 ("'The principle of copyright is this, it is a tax on
readers for the purpose of giving bounty to writers. The tax is an exceedingly bad one; it is a tax on
one of the most innocent and most salutary of human pleasures... ."'(quoting Lord Macaulay)).
See also Lunney, supra note 259.
301. 797 F.2d 1222, 1238 (3d Cir. 1986).
302. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 77 (D. Mass. 1990).
303. See Scotchmer, supra note 166, at 4-7; see also Lunney, supra note 259.
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aspect of measuring "public welfare." For, while encouraging innovation,
neither copyright nor patent laws encourage inefficiency. Put a bit more
succinctly, "It is true that one does not have to re-invent the wheel in order
to ride a bicycle," 3' but neither should one have to reinvent the bicycle.
The challenge for fair use generally is to ensure that whatever is
allowed to "stand on the shoulders" of a prior work adds to the intellectual
wealth of the society. Whether an author is actually rewarded monetarily
through a monopoly rent is a different question. Like other protected
works, this is a decision which society itself makes. Copyright is not a
sacrosanct grant of monopoly privileges, and the labor of authors must be
effectively compensated and guarded from theft. In between these two
premises lies the terrain of fair use, not limited to mediating between
exclusive rights and the public interest, but also ensuring that the copyright
system does not checkmate itself by preventing subsequent innovators
from using prior works. Thus, I would argue that there is a need to abrogate
the presumption in modem copyright that every copying, no matter how
minimal, is an infringement per se. 05 Where copying from a prior work is
substantial, fair use has the task of evaluating whether the work is new and,
as such, is simultaneously deserving of a fair use defense and its own
copyright protection. 3°6
Several cases have applied fair use to activity in cyberspace.30 7 The

courts in these cases have simply extended the traditional fair use analysis
to the allegedly infringing behavior with no concomitant examination or
explication of the nature of cyberspace and how, if at all, fair use ought to
be applied. However, the socio-political and economic character of
304. DENNIS GOU.Er,THEUNCERTAINPROMISE 34 (1989) (quoting Lord Ritchie-Calder, The
Role ofModern Science andTechnology in the Development ofNations,UNITEDNATIONS,SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY: THE ROLE OF MODERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INTHE DEVELOPMENT OF
NATIONS AND THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL SCIENTIFC OPERATIONS
AMONG STATES, U.N. Doe. E/5238/Add.1, at 11 (1973)).
305. At least one case has said as much. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp.
1150 (1991) (holding copying for parody to be fair use). But see Towle v. Ross, 32 F. Supp. 125 (D.
Or. 1940) (reflecting the prevailing view that any direct copying, no matter how minimal, is
infringement). As a result, the requirement that an infringing work be substantially similar is almost
irrelevant, particularly where copying is admitted (as is often the case with parody). Litchfield v.
Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1984); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977).
306. Interestingly, every successful fair use defense creates an additional set of rights to make
derivatives. In this sense, fair use may in theory also lead to greater production of works in the same
way as the original copyright grant. An unintended consequence of this suggestion might be the

heightening of the required creative element in copyright law, which I suggested earlier in this
Article.
307. See Storm Impact, Inc., v. Software of the Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782, 787 (N.D.
I1. 1998); see also Michaels v. Internet Entm't Group, 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 835 (C.D. Cal. 1998);
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communications Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1379-80
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
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cyberspace importunates more than a proforma extension of fair use to
cyberspace.
B. Revisiting Acuff-Rose andIts Progeny
The Supreme Court case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.30s and
its progenyo provide a possible framework for a future cyberspace fair use
doctrine. 310 However, the Acuff-Rose decision does not refine the doctrine
of fair use as much as is necessary for cyberspace. While flexibility is
important to allow the courts to determine the cases in a way that best
serves the underlying purposes of copyright, the courts cannot, and need
not, sacrifice coherence for flexibility. TheAcuff-Rose decision is in accord
with other fair use decisions where the focus has been on the purpose of
the use and not on the end product. The case, while significant in many
respects is, however, simply one battle won. Two recent fair use decisions
demonstrate the willingness of courts to limit fair use where the copyright
owner establishes a scheme for negotiating use licenses, regardless of the
purpose of the use.
In PrincetonUniversityPressv. MichiganDocument Services, Inc.,311
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a fair use claim for the
reproduction of multiple copies of copyrighted works for classroom use.
The central focus of the court's analysis was the existence of a licensing
regime established by the plaintiff. According to the court, there was no
justifiable reason for the defendant not to pay licenses for such use.31
Similarly, inAmerican Geophysical Unionv. Texaco, Inc.,313 the court held
that since photocopying is not a transformative use and, in addition, a
market to licensephotocopying exists, the defendants could not succeed on
a fair use claim. 314 The principles enunciated in PrincetonUniversity and
American Geophysical Union have been critically assessed in a recent law
review article.3 15 These two cases significantly undermine the potential,
evident in Acuff-Rose, for a reinvigorated fair use doctrine that focuses on
the value of using the protected works. In cyberspace, these cases are
particularly worrisome because of their reliance on the existence of
308. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
309. Two recent fair use decisions will be considered: Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich.
Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6thCir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied,520 U.S. 1156 (1997)
and American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
310. See generallyAcuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 570.
311. 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (enbanc).
312. Id. at 1387-88.
313. 60F.3d913 (2dCir. 1994).

314. Id. at 931-32. The dispute in American Geophysical Union was between publishers of
scientific and technical journals and Texaco whose research scientists often photocopied articles

from these journals. Id. at 914.
315. See Loren, supra note 57.
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licensing regimes and the assumption that such regimes preempt fair use.316
A blanket legitimization of automated rights management systems,
clickwrap licensing regimes, or other similar means to assert absolute
property rights over a work in cyberspace will automatically convert every
user into a taker/infringer. In constructing fair use for cyberspace, the
possibility of agreement between content providers and users through
licensing systems or via technological devices should not lead to a system
where users are excluded from a medium or forced to pay exorbitant prices
for use and access. Such a result will eviscerate the benefits of fair use, and
ultimately recreate patterns of resource allocation that institutionalize the
status of the information "haves" and the information "have nots." It also
increases the social cost of having a copyright system in the first instance.
If owners have an incentive, as they do currently, to resort to alternative
protection regimes, the costs of maintaining a copyright system will
ultimately outweigh the social benefits as under use of copyright becomes
a reality. I propose the following modifications to the fair use doctrine as
applied to cyberspace.
1. The Purpose and Character of the Use
or the Allegedly Infringing Work
The first element of the fair use test helps determine whether the new
work merely supplants the original "or instead, adds something new with
317
' While recognizing that a
a different purpose or different character."
318
transformative use is not "absolutely necessary" for a finding of fair use,
the Acuff-Rose Court noted that such works "lie at the heart of fair use. 3 19
Moreover, where a work has been greatly transformed, it will eclipse the
significance of commercialism in making a fair use32 determination. 3
Thereafter, the Court examined the nature of a parody.
Many cases have concluded that a parody may constitute fair use of a
protected work. 22 Yet, unlike prior decisions, the Court analogized parody
316. See kL at 32-47 (criticizing this trend and discussing some implications).
317. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (emphasis added).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See id. I am a little wary of the language of the court. " ransformative" works could
possibly embrace derivative works, which would still be considered a violation of the author's
rights. Since derivative works must also be infringing works, a determination of infringement is
necessary even when the derivative right is not in issue. This is why the court's conclusion of
infringement with no analysis is problematic. Also, determining what is a "transformative work"
becomes aproblem in new technology. See, e.g., SegaEnter., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510
(9th Cir. 1992) (discussing protection of videogame initialization codes).
321. See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579-80; see also Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 537
(9th Cir. 1956) (finding that a parody was not fair use).
322. See Fisher v.Dees, 794 F.2d432, 440 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air
Pirates, 581 F.2d 751,758 (9th Cir. 1978); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC Inc., 482 F. Supp. 741,747
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to commentary in order to justify a finding of fair use,3" and also
distinguished a parody from a commentary in order to label the former a
transformative work.3 4 The need to make this determination apparently
arose due to a Sixth Circuit finding that the parody afforded no critical
content. 3 1 Why this should defeat a fair use finding is unclear.32 6 It is clear,
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397,1398 (S.D.N.Y.

1975).
323. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 582.
324. See id. at 581. It is possible, and indeed is often the case, that a commentary is regarded
as a new or transformative work. But what ifthe work is transformative yet cannot be squaredaway
as a commentary or criticism? Is the transformative element ever strong enough to stand on its own
as affording the fair use defense? I also think that this analogy portends problems. Criticism and
commentaries have traditionally enjoyed a wide scope of protection under the fair use doctrine. As
such, extensive quotes from the protected work have been allowed. See, e.g., Robert Stigwood
Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. 376, 384-85 (D. Conn. 1972) ("[c]ritics may quote
extensively in order to comment effectively"). But see Loew's Inc. v. CBS, 131 F. Supp. 165, 183
(S.D. Cal. 1955) ("defendant may not legally appropriate under the pretext that burlesque as fair
use justifies a substantial taking"). In Acuff-Rose, if parody were really to be treated as a
commentary or critical review of the original "Pretty Woman," the apparent preoccupation with the
"amount and substantiality" used in the rap version was unnecessary. 510 U.S. at 586. While quality
of the portion copied is also a consideration, the Court had disposed of that by pointing out that the
heart of the original is what a parody must aim at if it will serve its purpose. Id. at 588. The
Supreme Court expressed no opinion as to the whether repetition of the bass riff constitutes
excessive copying, remanding the question back to the lower court. Id. at 590-92. Again, once the
quality element was disposed of, the Court, in light of precedent, need not have engaged in
extensive evaluation of the amount, nor perhaps even remand a question on it. If a parody is
criticism the amount of the taking is really not that significant. I suggest that the Court struggled
with this because it was trying tofit a parody square into a traditional, comfortable hole. This is the
bizarre, but ineluctable result of modem fair use analysis.
325. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1436 (6th Cir. 1992). The
circuit court referred to the song as merely a quick degeneration of the original. Id. at 1435-36 n.8.
While not finding a critical element, the circuit court assumed that there was one. However, having
done so, it went on to hold that the "blatantly commercial purpose" of the work prevented it from
being fair use. Id. at 1439; see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Co-op.
Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (defining parody as a work in which language
or style of a prior work is imitated for comic effect or ridicule and which contains some critical
comment or statement about the original work, reflecting the parodist's own (original) perspective).
326. But see Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun ofMe? Notes on Market Failureandthe
ParodyDefense in Copyright,21 AIPLA Q.J. 305 (1993). The majority decision inAcuff-Rose was
influenced by the fact that they could not see any "thematic relationship" between the original song
and the parody, therefore the latter could not properly be viewed as a critical comment on the
former. See Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1436. The absence of a thematic relationship is, however, a
stronger basis for the application of the fair use doctrine. As discussed in Part II, the thrust of
common law fair use was the use of part of a work to create a new, independent work. Thus, the
lack of a "thematic relationship," which may be a valid requirement of a critical review or
commentary, should be irrelevant to a fair use finding. Indeed, the existence of a "thematic
relationship" between a protected work and a critical review is precisely why courts have
historically provided that critical reviews may quote extensively from the protected use, without
violating the copyright. See, e.g., O'Reilly, 346 F. Supp. at 385 (noting that it maybe necessary for
critical reviews to quote the original extensively in order to be effective); Loew's Inc., 131 F. Supp.
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however, that where a court begins to inquire into the validity or legitimacy
of the allegedly infringing work, it is on less comfortable terrain.3 27 After
finding that the 2 Live Crew's version of "Pretty Woman" represented a
parody, the Supreme Court applied other case law holding that a parody,
like news or commentary, 328 may claim fair use.32 9
While serving the Court's purpose, the analogy to news or commentary
focuses inordinately on what the parody does as its legitimating factor,
rather than on what the parody is-a new work. However, this offers
insight into how fair use might work in cyberspace. Where the purpose and
character of use is consistent with the nature of the medium, fair use should
provide protection. Thus, the evolving norms of cyber-behavior such as
linking, forwarding, browsing, and in some circumstances caching-all
potential infringements under copyright law-would be excluded from the
reach of claims of infringement. 3 0 This is an important point because the
"real-space" analogies to these cyber-activities are not considered
infringements. For example, showing someone a letter that one receives or
reading a book that contains infringing material are not infringing acts,
demonstrating to some degree that the subject of the infringement claim in
cyberspace is both the activity and the enabling technology. In evaluating
fair use in cyberspace, courts should take note of how the technology
determines modes of communication, particularly in the case of hypertext
links, and what the technology enables users to do. Social welfare
comprises the sum of the use and the enhanced utilities that
communications technology offers and an application of fair use in
cyberspace should account for this ideal.

at 174 (noting that reviews may quote extensively from copyrighted works for purpose of
illustration and comment).
327. See Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d 7 at 1442-46 (Nelson, J., dissenting); see alsoAcuff-Rose, 510
U.S. at 582 (noting that it is outside the scope of the courts' responsibility to inquire into the merits
of a work for copyright protection).

328. The courts have historically given wide latitude to the use of works for the purposes of
criticism and literary review. Rather than exclude criticism as a separate category of work which
was the way it was treated at common law, modem fair use simply gives this use a wide latitude.
See, e.g., Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1265 (2d Cir. 1986); H.C. Wainwright
& Co. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 418 F. Supp. 620, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Loew's Inc., 131 F.
Supp. at 173-74.
329. Tin Pan Apple Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
330. The European Parliament recently proposed acopyrightdirective to ban caching of World
Wide Web content by Internet Service Providers serving European customers. In response to this
proposed directive, the Internet Society issued a statement urging the Parliament to reconsider its
proposal arguing, among other things, that caching drives internet service costs down thus making
it more efficient and affordable to a larger user population. See Internet Society Statement on Web
Caching Ban, E-mail from John Muller (Feb. 2, 1999) (on file with author).
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2. The Nature of the Medium
The second fair use element, the nature of the protected work, performs
a discriminating function for copyrighted works. The courts have long
recognized that certain forms of creative expression should be more
zealously protected than others. This element thus requires, in an odd
sense, an evaluation of the kind of work that is protected-asking subtly,
how much creativity has gone into the original work. The greater the level
of creativity, the closer the work reaches "the core of intended copyright
protection."33
Although the Acuff-Rose decision only briefly addresses this element,
the Court found that the original "Pretty Woman" fell within the core of
copyright protection,332 but that the distinction between "the fair use sheep
[and] the infringing goats ' 333 was not helpful in this instance since a
parody, like the early abridgements, requires some incorporation of the
prior work. However, this discriminating function is crucial in two
respects. First, it permits the courts to make a threshold decision about the
value of protecting certain kinds of works, such as factual compilations.33
Second, the higher the degree of creativity in the original, the greater the
possibility of infringement by a subsequent user absent some substantial
transformation in the allegedly infringing product. In a sense, then, this
second fair use element signals the court's need to evaluate the public
interest involved in protecting a new work which has utilized prior works.
This element should be augmented with a consideration of the nature
of the medium. In other words, the possibilities that new technology
presents to the public welfare should be considered in evaluating the
strength of protection to be afforded to a particular work in cyberspace.
Automated rights management systems and clickwrap licenses offer
copyright owners the possibility of protecting noncopyrightable material
or excluding access to noncopyrightable aspects of the copyrighted work,
thus eliminating the discriminating function that an evaluation of the
protected work otherwise achieves. However, a court's consideration of
the nature of the medium should prove to be a significant tool for users to
331. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586.
332. Id.; see also MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that when

determining whether a particular use is fair, courts may consider whether the work was creative,
imaginative and original); see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 223, 242

(D. Mass 1993) (reasoning that the scope of copyright protection is greater and a finding offair use
is less likely the greater the creative expression found in a work). See generally Robert Gorman,
Fact or Fancy? The Implicationsfor Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 560 (1982).
333. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586.
334. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1991); see also

Lunney, supranote 259, at 487 (arguing that the tension implicit in the incentives-access paradigm
leads to a perverse result. The more necessary the work, in this case the medium, the more
important it is to provide access. However, relying on access alone, Professor Lunney argues it
means for such important works there might be less protection.).
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facilitate access to elements of the protected work that are already free, by
law, for use. It would also facilitate use welfare by permitting uses in

cyberspace that might otherwise constitute infringement simply because of
the nature of the medium.
3. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
and the Utility of the Underlying Work

This element would evaluate whether the alleged infringer took just
what was needed to accomplish the purpose or produce the object that

incorporates a portion of the protected work. For a traditional analysis,
because fair use is a defense to infringement claims, aprimafaciecase for
infringement is the first step to the examination of fair use." 5 To establish
infringement, the plaintiff must prove "substantial similarity" between the
alleged infringing product and the copyrighted work. Once this primafacie

case has been established, the assertion of fair use as a defense triggers
another level of inquiry, namely whether the elements of fair use can be
found in the defendant's use of the copyrighted work. Thus, in Apple
Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp, 6 the court found infringement

where programs sold by the defendant Franklin were "virtually identical"

to those covered by Apple's copyright.337 In Folsom, the court held
"[where] the labors of the original author are substantially... appropriated

by another," infringement would be found by a court.338 In Story, a century
earlier, the court made it clear that in order to avoid a finding of liability
for infringement, a work utilizing portions of copyrighted material must

not "convey the same knowledge as the original work." 39 In its modem

335. Cf. Deborah Kemp, Limitations Upon the Software Producer'sRight: Vault Corp. v.

Quaid Software Ltd., 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.85 (1990) (pointing out that fair use
analysis always arises in the context of infringement claims, regardless of the amount of copying
in question). Kemp points out that historically, de minimis copying was actually grounds for
denying infringement, rather than grounds on which an infringement claim could rest. Id. at 108.
This argument has found support in some modem decisions. See, e.g., Loew's Inc. v. CBS, Inc.,
131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (stating more extensive use of copyrighted material is
permissible so long as a substantial part is not taken); Karll v. Curtis Pub. Co., 39 F. Supp. 836,837
(E.D. Wis. 1941) ("[C]opyright contemplates and permits fair use by all persons."). This position
is also credible when viewed in the common law cases from which Justice Story distilled the four
fairuse factors now codified in the law. Folsomv. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). Since
these cases dealt with abridgementswhich by nature embodied a significant portion of the protected
work, a fair use factor focusing on the amount of work appropriated was almost indispensable in
those cases. Its continuing validity, given the expansion of copyright to derivative works, and even
without it, given the judicial tendency towards protectionism, is doubtful. See Sandoval v. New
Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215 (1998) and Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d
70 (1997) (both addressing de minimus use as a defense to infringement).
336. 714 F.2d 1240 (3rd Cir. 1983).
337. Id. at 1245.
338. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348.
339. Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 174 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847).
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form, however, the test applied focuses on the similarity of the works,
namely the "'total concept and feel test"' of copyright infringement.?
This third fair use element performs a policing function by guarding the
quality of work protected, and ensuring that an allegedly infringing product
does not perpetuate a fraud on the public by gaining a monopoly without
genuinely adding to the wealth of intellectual goods. Thus, taking a
relatively small, but indispensable or critical part of a work, could
constitute an infringement."1 In addition to quality, this element
traditionally analyzes the quantity of the portions used; a product that only
makes cosmetic changes will not overcome an infringement claim. In its
analysis, the Court found that although the Acuff-Rose parody copied the
"heart of the original," it did so only to fulfill its parodic intent, for
example, to conjure up the original in the minds of the listeners.342 Once
it accomplished this goal, the court found that the song took on "distinctive
sounds," with various other additions markedly departing from the
original. 3
The Court in Acuff-Rose interpreted the amount and substantiality
34
element as turning on the "justification of the particular copying done."
This element does not revert to the "nature and purpose of the copying"
element of the fair use test. Rather, it serves to identify whether the portion
copied was simply enough to accomplish the goal of creating a new work
which is substantially different from the original. The rationale thus
appeals to the utility of the underlying work, opening up the possibility of
examining how another user might reimagine aprior protected work. Thus,
the element as reconceived would be consistent with Acuff-Rose and
meaningfully account for the diversity of uses in cyberspace by
accommodating an evaluation of the utility of cyberspace itself or certain
cyberpractices. Augmenting the fair use doctrine in this manner dovetails
with two other doctrines that limit the scope of copyright in the interests
of the public: the idea/expression dichotomy and, more limitedly, the
merger doctrine.
The amount and substantiality of the copyrighted work has already
become an issue with photographs on the Internet. In a recent preliminary
ruling handed down by a Southern California federal judge, the court held
340. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167

(9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir.
1970)).

341. See Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520,534-35 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding
that where the portion copied is key or essential, it is substantial enough to weigh against a fair use
finding); see also Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding no clear law discerning when a

violation of infringement constitutes copyright violation).
342. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,588 (1994).

343. Id. at 589.
344. l at 586.
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that thumbnail reproductions of database images by a search engine is not
an infringement2' 5 While the court did not rule on this as a matter of fair
use, the alleged infringer claimed that it was a matter of fair use because
the search engine only reproduced small sizes of the pictures. 6 Users are
adding to the body of copyright myths3 7 by asserting that the size of the
digital image has a bearing on whether the use is fair. Clearly this is, at
best, an attempt to apply the quantitative element of the fair use analysis
to works such as photographs that are not as amenable to this element. As
the plaintiff in this case asserted, whether a picture is small or big, if it is
reproduced in its entirety and it is a copyright violationY
There are several ways a court might deal with this problem, the easiest
being a holding that reproduction by a search engine is not an
infringement. These programs allow users to locate and retrieve
information from the Internet. The notorious Ninth Circuit decisions in
MaiSystem, Corp.v. Peak Computer49 andMicro Starv. Formgen,Inc.,35
unfortunately mitigate against such a holding. Search engine functions, I
would argue, are part of the design framework of cyberspace. Such designs
should enjoy some degree of protection from infringement actions because
they are integral to what cyberspace is. The appropriate degree would then
be a matter for a fair use determination.
4. Convert the Market Test to a Measure of Damages
Finally, I would eliminate the traditional fourth factor, the effect of the
use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted work, as an
element of fair use and instead apply it as one of the measurements for
damages if infringement and not fair use were to be found. The fourth
factor is often considered the most important in modem fair use analysis.
It requires the court to look at the market harm caused by the work of the
alleged infringer. 351The court must evaluate the impact of the use upon the
actual or potential "market" for the protected work,352 which includes the
market for derivative works. 353 The pertinent question asks whether the
345. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
346. See id; see also Victoria Slind-Flor, Thumbnail Not Even a Tiny Infringement,NAT'L
L.J., Dec. 6, 1999, at B7.

347. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 4, at 1274 (noting a variety of copyright myths about what
is permissible).
348. See Kelly, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
349. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
350. 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).
351. See Association of Am. Med. Coils. v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1991).

352. See Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1078 (2d Cir. 1992).
353. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,482 (1984) (Blackmun,

J., dissenting); see also Sega Enter., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992);
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 1992).
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allegedly infringing work will act as a substitute for the prior work,354
thereby reducing demand for the prior work or materially affecting its

sale. 55

As stated above, prior to Acuff-Rose a presumption of unfairness
attached to every commercial use of protected work. 6 However, theAcuffRose court recognized the distinction between a total or substantial
appropriation of a copyrighted work, like those at issue in Sony and
Folsom, as well as a transformative work.357 One prominent scholar
anticipated this as the most important aspect of a future Supreme Court
decision which Acuff-Rose proved to be.358 The Court in Acuff-Rose
overturned the distinctions in Sony and Folsom, where the issue at stake
was total duplication 359 or appropriation of a substantial portion of a

copyrighted work.360 The Court found that when a new work is

transformative, "market harm may not be so readily inferred. ' 361 The
Court, with amazing dexterity, sidestepped the issue of whether a parody

is a derivative work, to hold that harm to derivatives is its only valid
concern.3 62 Again reverting to the treatment of all parody as a comment or
354. Marvin WorthProds. v. SuperiorFilms Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269,1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
355. See Mura v. CBS, Inc., 245 F. Supp 587, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
356. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
583-84 (1994); Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 210-11 (D. Mass. 1986);
Pamela Samuelson, FairUsefor Computer Programsand Other CopyrightableWorks in Digital
Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob, and Sega, 1 J. INTELL PROP. L. 49, 64 n.63 (1993).
357. SeeAcuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 584.
358. See Samuelson, supra note 356, at 64 n.63 (stating her hope that the Supreme Court
would eventually overrule the presumption of unfairness).
359. The Sony case involved the use of video cassette recorders (or VTR's-video tape
recorders as they were then called) to record television programs and movies. Universal brought
suit against Sony Corp., the manufacturers of the VTR's, for contributory infringement due to the
potential useby private viewer's of VTR's to record copyrighted programs. Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
In a controversial and momentous decision, a majority of the Supreme Court held that Sony's sale
of VTR's did not constitute contributory infringement because of the substantial non-infringing
uses consumers could make of therm. I at 456. While Sony is often treated as a significant fair use
case, I am of a different opinion. Sony involved the use of an unrelated product to copy protected
work. The VTR itself did not represent a fair use of the protected programs. It was the use of the
VTR that constituted fair use. Thus while Sony is indeed an important decision in the application
of copyright law to new technology, it is not, strictly speaking, really a fair use case. The same
concern is applicable to the Galoob case. For various approaches to the Sony decision, see Wendy
Gordon, FairUse As Market Failure:A Structuraland Economic Analysis of the Beta Max Case
and Its Predecessors,82 COL.IMB.L. REV. 1600 (1982). It is interesting to note, however, that
Universal Studios presented an argument against a finding of fair use by Sony. It argued that since
the copying done by VTR users was intrinsic copying and not creative copying fair use could not
attach. Sony, 464 U.S. at 427. This argument infers that the common law fair use form, and the U.S.
departure from it was already obvious at this time.
360. SeeAcuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 591.
361. Id
362. Id. Obviously, criticism and commentary would not be considered derivative works. This
is one advantage of hiding a parody under this rubric. The Court determined that the parody was
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criticism, the court found that, like the former categories, "the fact that a
parody may impair the market for derivative [works] by the . . .

effectiveness of its critical commentary" is not relevant. 63 The Court,
therefore, held that the parody should be examined to see whether or not

it qualifies as a fair use.36
The Court's treatment of parody in Acuff-Rose has beneficial

consequences for cyberspace. If communication is the goal, then fair use
will help distinguish between communication that is the sine qua non of
the Internet and mere exploitation of another's proprietary interests. A
strong copyright regime with a narrow fair use doctrine closes the

opportunity for "information spinoffs" in much the same way a strong
patent system does for future improvements without fulfilling the higher

standard of creativity which underlies a grant for patent protection. This
effect of a narrow fair use doctrine has long been recognized.3 65 The issue
should not be that literal replication exists, but rather whether there is a

conveyance of the same information using the original as a source. Again,
in cyberspace, where browsing, editing, and forwarding e-mail is a
standard practice, the first fair use element will be useful in serving to

distinguish whether such use is part of the progress engenderec by the
technology or an impermissible appropriation.
The market test is a difficult one where new technology is concerned.

Every use of a work, no matter how innocent, minimal, or fair, will affect
the sale of the original. 366 This fact is undisputed even where a finding of

fair use has been sustained on statutory grounds, such as a literary or movie

review. 367 A critical review often destroys the market for a new work or
not likely to affect the market for the original because they serve different market functions. See id.
It was unlikely that the parody would serve as a "substitute for the original." Id. at 571. However,
the critical question it seems, is whether the use of "enough to conjure up the original" which is
fundamental to a parody, makes the parody "substantially similar" to the original in order to satisfy
the test for derivative works.
363. Id. at 593.
364. l
365. See, e.g., Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171. Justice McLean opined that "[tihe same rule
of decision should be applied to a copyright as to a patent for a machine. The construction of any
other machine which acts upon the same principle, however its structure may be, varied is an
infringement on the patent .... Now an abridgement, if fairly made, contains the principle of the
original work, and this constitutes its value. Why then, in reason and justice, should not the same
principle be applied in a case of copyright as in that of a patented machine?... But a contrary
doctrine has long been established." Id at 173. See also Lemley, supra note 166.
366. The cotton gin, invented by Eli Whitney, was improved by innovators whose profit was
subsequently diminished by the ensuing competition. See generally JEANNETrE MIRSKY & ALAN
NEVINS, THE WORLD OF ELI WHrrNEY (1993). As one court noted, "There is no fair or noncompeting use of copyright material unless by consent." Towle v. Ross, 32 F. Supp. 125, 127 (D.
Or. 1940).
367. Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act specifies certain uses of a copyrighted work that
would not normally not be subject to claims of infringement. Examples include use for "purposes
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movie. Yet, the review is, subject to some broad limitations on the amount
used, typically considered a fair use of copyrighted material.
There are two distinct senses in which courts have employed "market"

in an infringement analysis and in a fair use analysis. The first sense
involves the pure marketability of the original work. In other words, is this

new work a substitute3" for the original? The roots of this sense of
marketability can be found in Folsom.369 If the use of another work is for
the purpose of superseding the use of the original work and substituting for
it, this would be "deemed in law a piracy."37

The rationale behind this aspect of marketability is intuitive. One
should not be permitted to use another person's work to destroy the
original work. This prevents fair use from being used both as a sword and

a shield by subsequent authors. It furthers the public good by ensuring that
goods created by different individuals are either different in the sense that
they meet different needs37 1 or that they are different in the sense that they

enrich the store of creative works.372 The inquiry into the amount and
substantiality of the portion used, then, aids in analyzing the level of
creativity that went into the subsequent work. This element of the fair use

analysis is necessary to determine whether the allegedly infringing work
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching... scholarship, or research." 17 U.S.C. § 107
(2000). While there is a presumption of fair use for such uses, this presumption is not dispositive
of the outcome of the fair use analysis. The use must still be examined under the four elements of
the fair use test. See Harper & Row, Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enter., Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 551-52
(1985).
368. One of the reasons the market effect test is difficult to use is that unless one has literally
work copied a protected work, protected expression can communicate the same thing in different
words. Since ideas are not protectedby copyright law, the ability to substitute one work for another,
thereby affecting the market for the first work, is quite easy to accomplish.
369. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342,345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
370. Id.; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
371. See generallyVault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
372. See Hoehing v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980). The court
found that, in dealing with fiction, "the distinction between an idea and its expression is especially
elusive." Id.at 978. The court observed that "copyright provides a financial incentive to those who
would add to the corpus of existing knowledge by creating original works." Id. at 974. Though the
two story plots at issue in the case were "necessarily" similar, the court found there was no
infringement because the public benefitted from the "development of historical and biographical
works." l at 978. It is unclear what really motivated the court's decision. Traditionally, there has
been a strong policy in favor of biographical and historical works. Does the wide latitude given to
authors to rely on prior works of history indicate judicial favor of historical work, or that the public
benefits greatly from this kind of work? In short, is it the nature of the work per se, or the
conviction that given the nature of the work, public welfare is significantly enhanced by
encouraging the use of prior works? It is also unclear why there is a presumption that the latitude
given to authors in using prior historical accounts will "encourag[e] the development of historical
and biographical works and their public distribution." Id. It is antithetical to the prevailing
presumption in intellectual property law generally, that it is strong protection, with limited and
narrowly construed exceptions, that encourages development and creativity.
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is simply the result of a "facile use of scissors"37 3 or whether independent,
significant, "intellectual labor and judgment 374 were utilized in creating
the allegedly infringing work. As noted earlier, courts have long
recognized that the use of a limited, but essential or valuable, portion of the
original work is an infringement; it is not necessary that the whole or the
larger part be used.375 It is important to note that the courts have also held
that "the fact that an entire work is reproduced does not have its ordinary
effect of militating against a finding of fair use., 37 6 Where the ultimate use
is limited, that factor carries little weight. Again, this element serves the
Internet well, particularly given the practice of wholesale downloading and
forwarding of copyrighted works. Some might argue that these practices
are precisely why a limited fair use doctrine should apply to cyberspace.
In response, certain nontransformative uses ought not to be fair uses; for
example, copying and distributing literary or musical work merely to avoid
having to pay for it and absent any potential educational or political benefit
from doing so. In such cases, the intent or purpose and justification of the
copying or distribution would weigh heavily against such a use. The
prospects of abuse of welfare doctrines should not become a basis for
negating the value of public welfare in cyberspace. Recent history
demonstrates that in the cyberwars over ownership, the prophylactics have
had far greater consequences than the imagined disease.
The market test has traditionally exerted the greatest influence on the
court's decision. 3 " This is the most serious implication for new
technology, because the market invariably informs the success of new
technology. It is also clear that commercial success is an important part of
a decision to invest in innovation in the first place. The combined effect of
a market test and a right to make derivative works brings new technologies
that are the subject matter of copyright unjustifiably closer to the monopoly
type protection afforded innovation under a patent regime. Finally, it
should be noted that the commercial impact/market test is somewhat
redundant in the context of new technology. The pace of innovation
requires that a product be competitive to ensure success in the market
place. In cyberspace, success is determined by use of the information or
access to it. Suboptimal use would be considered inefficient. Thus,
attempts to measure harm by the impact on the market must take, as a
measure, the success of that particular website or or bulletin board;
however, it is users that determine the success of any of these "markets."
The increasingly commercial nature of cyberspace will engender much
373. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342,345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
374. Id.

375. See id.; see also Harper & Row, Publ'rs, Inc. v. Nation Enter., Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 550
(1985); Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1156-57 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).
376. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,449-50 (1984).
377. See Association of Am. Med. Coils. v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1991).
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pressure to limit the fair use doctrine: owners are interested in utilizing the
new medium for greater economic gain, but unwilling to recognize user
interests in the efficiencies that the medium also provides.
C. Lessons from Section 117 of the 1976 CopyrightAct: Towards an
Architecture
In 1977, the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU) recommended treating computer programs
as a form of literary work. 78 The report effectively argued for the extension
of copyright principles including fair use to computer generated works,
seeing no insurmountable problems to treating computer programs as a
form of literary work.379 How does a court determine the fair use of a work
which utilizes some component of a new technology? In other words, what
rules should determine what constitutes fair use of information accessed
from the Internet or from an Internet Service Provider? More interestingly,
what would constitute a fair use of a databases or other computer generated
works which are more similar to hardware? For example, is it fair use
when a painting-optically scanned, color coded, and bit-mapped-is
translated into a musical work by digital technology? 8 ° Is it a new work or
a copy when information is digitally reprocessed from information derived
from a database?"'
Section 117 of the 1976 Copyright Act lists a category of copying that
is immune from infringement claims.382 These uses include the right of the
lawful owner of a copy of a computer program to copy or adapt a program
if the new copy or adaptation "is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and...
is used in no other manner.' '383 Whenever Congress has intervened to
accommodate users' rights within a specific technological development,
it has resulted in complex systems of management that confound even the
most astute copyright scholar or practitioner. 3" The fact is, legislative
interventions are themselves costly. The rules that emerge are complex and
difficult to follow. For cyberspace, legislating exemptions for specific uses,
in addition to leaving room to consider specific designs under a fair use
doctrine may be a prudent strategy since we cannot predict how the Internet

378. CONTU Report, supra note 5.
379. Miller, supra note 134, at 979, 983.
380. See Paul Edward Geller, The Universal Electronic Archive: Issues in International

Copyright, 25 INT'LREV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L 54, 63-65 (1994).
381. See id.
382. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1998).

383. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (1998).
384. The DMCA is a supreme example of this. See supra note 7.
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will evolve.385 It is important for a court to identify framework or design
elements that are integral to the function of cyberspace, while
understanding that these too are not necessarily immutable.
The Acuff-Rose decision extended the fair use defense to parodies,386
notwithstanding the commercial nature of the parody.3 87 In recognizing that
the success of a parody lies in its ability to "conjure up at least enough of
' the Court
the original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable,"388
focused more on the nature of the work rather than its commercial element.
Thus, when use of the "essence" of the original is a necessary part of
fulfilling the purpose of the allegedly infringing work, a defense of fair use
may be sustained.38 9
The "essence" in the cyberspace context might currently include
hypertext links or tools that might foster interoperability. There are, then,
at least two possible approaches to the concept of fair use in cyberspace.
First, a test that accommodates the medium itself as the object of fair use,
and second a more traditional approach that examines the use of content
in cyberspace. For the latter, the cardinal requirement should still be that
the use of prior work be productive, either in the transformative sense or
simply by virtue of enhanced skill and knowledge. In some cases,
particularly where there may be use of prior work, the "newness" of the
work or level of creativity required should be substantive, and not simply
a new form of expressing the same work. A painting that is transformed
into music through a technological process is, for example, a new
"expressive" work and should be considered fair use under the common
law version of the doctrine. However, it presents a significant issue for
even newer technology: the music, while a copyrightable subject matter,
was made possible through a technological process which is not
copyrightable. Is this type of expression, made possible only by
technological process, a copyrightable expression? "Whose" (or "what")
"creativity" is being rewarded?3" I would suggest that it is the interaction
of human expression and technological advance that is being protected
under the aegis of copyright. The fair use doctrine I propose for cyberspace
explicitly accommodates this new reality of "authorship" and "creativity."
385. There is a hint of this problem in the MPAA lawsuit where one of the contested issues
is the provision of Links to sites that host infringing material. Information available at
http:lleon.law.harvard.edulopenlawlDVD/ or at http://www.2600.comnewsL.

386. A parody is "a writing in which the language and style of an author or work is closely
imitated for comic effect." WEBSTER'S TMRD NEW INTERNATiONAL DICrIONARY 1643 (1981).

387. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,572 (1994).
388. Id. at 588.
389. Clearly this may lead to an unfettered use of protected works. The courts simply need to
construe "necessary" strictly, by looking to the nature of the allegedly infringing work. The courts
have done this when faced with new technology. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City

Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
390. This is already an issue with a proposed right of publicity for digital images.
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The digital reprocessing of information, on the other hand, should fail
under both approaches, but particularly under the common law doctrine.
Where information is stored, for example, on a CD-ROM, such storage
should not be considered a translation for the purpose of copyright
protection. Neither should it be considered transformative for the purpose
of a fair use defense. It essentially is the same information in a different
form. Any attempt to protect it presents the same dilemma-what
"creativity" is being rewarded? In an increasingly technological age, we
must be careful not to derive "creativity" from mere labor, nor permit the
two to become indistinguishable.
Modem fair use has departed from its roots. Its use as an affirmative
defense to an infringement claim is both misplaced and misused. In Harper
& Row Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enters.,391 the Supreme Court noted that
the doctrine of fair use, traditionally predicated upon the author's implied
consent to a "reasonable and customary" use of his work, was not
recognized as a defense. 392 And in the most recent exposition of the fair use
doctrine, the Supreme Court repeated the cardinal rule of fair use analysis:
"From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for the fair
use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill
copyright's very purpose. '393 Throughout the years, courts have built upon
this concept of fair use in an attempt to mediate between the public interest
in having new works as well as access to creative works and the interests
of authors to have their works adequately protected from infringement.
New technology brings fair use full circle. In fair use analysis involving
new technologies, the questions have had to focus on the purpose of the
law and whether or not the allegedly infringing product impedes or
promotes that purpose. This balancing act has led to a two-tier framework
which, depending on the context, has required a probing evaluation of the
nature of the new work.39
For cyberspace, a presumption of fairness, not infringement, should be
considered for a limited spectrum of activities. While proprietors and
producers of works have never been comfortable with any presumption of
fairness, 395 it seems incongruous to grant, much less limit, this presumption
to private noncommercial use. Those who would productively use Internet
technology, will inevitably use it in commerce broadly construed. 3 6 If we
391. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
392. Id. at 550.
393. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).
394. See, e.g., id. at 569; Sega Enter., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992);
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
395. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 449-50
(1984).
396. See generallyAlfred C. Yen, Entrepreneurship,Copyright,andPersonalHome Pages,
75 OR. L. REv. 331 (1996).
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must have presumptions at all, a presumption of fairness should be
extended to productive commercial use as well as noncommercial private
use. Both these uses promote some element of public welfare: the new
work has effectively utilized the old to give society a new intellectual
product and the private noncommercial use has enabled one individual to

enrich and empower her life. Courts must be mindful of the chosen method
to accomplish public welfare goals, namely, rewarding authors while
adopting implementation strategies to ensure that welfare goals are
protected.397Further developments in technology will continue to test this
balancing act. 9
V. CONCLUSION

Economists have debated long and hard about how to measure social
welfare and under what circumstances specific choices may be deemed to
advance social welfare. Despite several competing models, three factors
are clearly important for this determination: the allocation choice should
include more people and not less; the allocation choice should improve on
previous conditions; and the allocation choice should minimize cost.39 A

vision of fair use rooted in these norms will yield important economic and
social value for society at large.
As use of the Internet exploded, and the copyright industry agitated
over the potentially devastating impact of information technology on their
ability to control use and dissemination of copyrighted material, Congress
followed its traditional course of responding to new technology by
expanding owners' rights." The"cut" and "paste" approach evident in the
397. See generallyLotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass.
1990).
398. See Samuelson, supra note 356. Her article explores some uses of digital technology
which displace the comfortable framework of modem fair use analysis. She concludes that these
digital uses, and their results, are thus far manageable within the current framework. See id. at 10216.
399. See generally KENNETH L ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951)

(explaining the logic of choices made by a collective body in response to the individual preferences
of its members).
400. See Lehman Statement, infra note 416 (stating as fact that copyright evolves in response
to technological change and that Congress has historically responded to such change by enacting
statutes to cater to new technology). The orthodoxy of rote expansion of rights by Congress has
been challenged in a recent lawsuit filed by Harvard Law professors contesting the constitutionality
of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) of 1998. Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1998). The issues at stake in the lawsuit represent the frontier of
legal challenges to how resources will be allocated in cyberspace. Moreover, the issues at stake in the
lawsuit symbolize the transformative power ofinformation technology as it provides new avenues for
citizens all over the world to recreate their lives, redirect their creativity, and contribute to social and
political empowerment. For example, the Eldritch Press was founded in 1995 to demonstrate the
superior capabilities of Internet publishing. The Press has a specialized collection of novels, typically
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current legislative environment of copyright law assumes that the public

welfare vision which fueled the Constitutional mandate

°1 for intellectual

property protection remains a fixed star in our two hundred and fifty year
old constellation of intellectual property jurisprudence. Perhaps more

directly, it assumes that the extant categories of intellectual property can
and should be maintained in cyberspace as the best means for
accomplishing the Constitutional mandate. 4°2 Legal scholarship that has

evaluated this assumption has tended to focus on the application of
copyright law to cyberspace, emphasizing the areas where such wholesale
application is likely to be problematic, infeasible, or subversive of the
policy goals of copyright law.
The scholarship centers on the application of copyright principles to

new technologies; specifically, the challenges this medium poses to copyright administration. 4° ' For example, a burgeoning body of literature has
4 4
examined the advent of copyright management systems as an altemative 0
of out ofprint works, and makes them availableby utilizinghypertextmarkup language. See id.These
works are thus globally accessible by any World Wide Web browser. The Press adds value to the
posted works by including notes, illustrations, links to other Internet sources, and a variety of other
features. For selected academic critiques of rights expansion, see James Boyle, IntellectualProperty
Policy Online:A Young Person'sGuide, 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 47 (1996). Policy makers "view
intellectual property rights as a simple linear function. They act as if the more intellectual property
rights wegrant and the 'larger' wemakeeach right, themore creators will producenewbooks, movies,
computer programs, and pharmaceuticals." Id. at 48; Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and
Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv. 275 (1989). See generallyElkin-Koren, supra note 168.
401. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (vesting Congress with power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
402. The private sector, in concert with the Clinton Administration and with support from
some legal scholars, successfully advocated for a stronger property rights regime for information
goods, and/or for greater private regulation of the use of such goods in cyberspace, on the grounds
that the nature of the Internet optimizes efficient transactions. See Bell, supranote 1; Robert P.
Merges, The EndofFriction?PropertyRights and Contractin the "Newtonian " World of On-Line
Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TIECH. L.J. 115 (1997); I. Trotter Hardy, Property(and Copyright) in
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHL LEGAL F. 217 (1996). In 1993, President Clinton established the
Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF) to explore, articulate and recommend strategies to
promote the development of the National Information Infrastructure (Nil). The Working Group on
Intellectual Property was charged with the responsibility to examine U.S. intellectual property law
and policy in light of the NII and recommend changes. The Working Group released a preliminary
report (Green Paper) on July 7, 1994, and issued a final report (White Paper) in 1995. Both the
Green Paper and the White Paper have been heavily criticized for emphasizing owner's rights and
skewing the traditional copyright equilibrium. See, e.g., PeterJaszi, Caughtin the Net of Copyright,
75 OR. L. REV. 299 (1996); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 29 (1994); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab,WIED 4.01, Jan. 1996, at 134.
403. See Niva Elkin-Koren, supranote 216, at 380-97 (identifying conceptual difficulties in

extending copyright principles to digital technology); see alsoJ.H. Reichman &PamelaSamuelson,
IntellectualPropertyRights in Data?,50 VAND. L. REv. 51, 124-30 (1997).
404. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A CloserLook at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace,28 CONN. L. REv. 981, 1029 (1996); Julie E. Cohen, Copyrightand
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(or superior 405) means of securing enforcement of copyright in the digital
era. Additional arguments point to the risk of market failure from lax or
unenforceable cyberspace property rights and suggest that current forms of
protection will lead to undesirably low levels of production in information
goods.f Other scholars have argued that stronger rights secured either
through contract law or increased copyright protection are not inexorable
means of achieving the Constitutional mandate of promoting public
welfare in cyberspace. 4 7 These "cyberrealists" 4 8 question the legitimacy
of the economic assumptions posed by the "cybereconomists" 4 9 and
challenge the specific vision of welfare implicit in their economic
modeling.10
However, the arguments against a stronger copyright regime and in
favor of sui generisprotection for cyberspace have relied on measurements
of public welfare also utilized by cybereconomists. Both groups envision
"progress," defined as a sufficiently high production of creative works, as
a proper measure of public welfare, but differ as to how best to realize that
vision.4 1 1 The assumption appears to be that traditional measurements of
public welfare remain valid. Consequently, attempts to examine the
broader implications of the public welfare objective explicitly mandated
in the Constitution have been "captured" by the inherent limitations and
deficiency of this view of progress. 12 The Constitutional clause has yielded
indeterminacy in constructing appropriate boundaries for the scope of
Congressional power in the area of intellectual property, and thus offers no
operative measure of the public interest outcome of legislative activity.
the Jurisprudenceof Self-Help, 13 BE E
TECH.
'
L. J. 1089, § 2 (1998); Rick G. Morris, Use
of Copyrighted Images in Academic Scholarship and Creative Work: The Problems of New
Technologies and a Proposed "Scholarly License," 33 IDEA 123, 149 (1993) (suggesting a
compulsory licensing scheme).
405. BEII, supra note 1, at 567.
406. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 403, at 55; see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
PropertyandInnovationin the GlobalInformation Infrastructure,1996 U. CH. LEGALF. 261,276.
407. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 403, at 72-106.
408. Legal realism questioned the epistemologies oflegal order epitomized by Lochnerv. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). There is a critical mass of scholarship that has been identified as the
school of legal realism. See, e.g., AMERICANLEGALREAUSM xiii (William W. Fisher, iH et al. eds.,
1993). I dub those who challenge orthodox economic views of how to manage intellectual property,
or who deconstruct the values of an economie climate in cyberspace that purports to be neutral, as
cyberrealists.
409. This metaphor was coined by Julie Cohen. See Cohen, supra note 165, at 464.
410. See id, at 515-33.

411. See id. at 464 n.6. (asserting that she does not challenge the progress/access criteria of
cybereconomists but the means by which they argue it should be pursued). But see Lunney, supra
note 259 (criticizing this dominant paradigm).
412. But see Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress":Reconsidering the Copyright and
PatentPower,43 DEPAuLL. REv. 97 (1993) (offering a vision of progress as informed by social
mores and needs). See generally Lunney, supra note 259.
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While constitutional arguments have gained allure in recent times, what is
needed is new language for evaluating and arguing over the legitimacy of
intellectual property laws.
. In this Article, I have argued that the debate over which legal regime

should prevail over the protection of content on the Intemet-sui generis
or copyright law-must be recast in light of the radical changes that

communications technology has engendered in the way we live, think, and
interact. 413 Cyberspace is a distinct economy and the determination of how
intellectual property rights will apply to it is fundamentally a question of
resource allocation. 414 Increased property rights inhibit opportunities for
413. An estimated 200 million people were expected to use the Internet in 1999. See Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997). Other technology, such as the television or radio, have also had
profound effects on society. However, the combined audio, visual, and interactive capability of
communications technology engenders a medium in which political, economic and social
interaction is radically effected and affected. Exclusion from the Internet will reinforce the
underprivileged position of poor citizens and exacerbate the economic divide by perpetuating the
growth of a class of ill-equipped citizens. The U.S. government is keenly aware of this and has
devised several initiatives to address concerns of a widening digital gap. For example, the
Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 mandated a plan based on four pillars: making modem
computers and learning devices accessible to every student; connecting classrooms to one another
and to the outside world; making educational software an integral part of the curriculum; ensuring
that teachers are ready to use and teach with technology. See Pub. L 103-382, October 20, 1994;
108 Stat. 3518. See generallyRosemary J. Coombe, Left Out on the InformationSuper Highway,
75 OR. L. REV. 237 (1996) (offering a critique of the dominantly Western dialogue that permeates
the Internet and pointing out how the commodification ofculture in the formofintellectual property
rights occludes use of, and access to, information); U.S. Department of Commerce, FallingThrough
the Net: A Survey of "Have Nots" in Urban and Rural America (1995) at
http:llwww.ntia.doc.gov:/ntiahomelfallingthru.html (last visited Mar. 17, 1999); U.S. Department
of Education Technology Home Page, at http:llwww.ed.gov/Technology/potuscommit.html (last
visited Aug. 4, 1999).
414. Indeed the government is cognizant of the tremendous economic opportunity portended
by the National Information Infrastructure (NIl). In a statement before the House of
Representatives, Bruce Lehman identified seven promises of the NIl. These include:
(1) a greater amount and variety of information entertainment resources, delivered
quickly and economically all over the world; (2) access to rich cultural resources
around the world transforming and expanding the scope and reach of the arts and
humanities and broadening cultural experiences through diversity of content; (3)
support for education and library systems; (4) enhanced competitiveness for U.S.
business and the promotion ofjob creation, economic growth, and well being for
Americans; (5) new job opportunities in the creation, processing organizing,
packaging and dissemination of information, education and entertainment
products; (6) technology, trade and business opportunities for new products and
new markets for U.S. industries; (7) a wider variety and greater number of choices
for consumption of books, movies, music, computer programs and other copyright
works, increased competition and reduced prices.
Hearings on S. 1284 and H.R. 2441 before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual property of
the Senate and House Comm on the Judiciary (1995) (statement of Bruce Lehman, Assistant

Secretary of Commerce).
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ordinary citizens to appropriate, fully, the panoply of benefits derived from
and through information technology. Expansive copyright protection favors
those who create and own information, but fails to consider the other vital
component of the information revolution-public welfare. The utilitarian
emphasis of intellectual property policy has been transposed to the Internet
as though the Internet was, itself, a result of the intellectual property
regime. By focusing on how to adapt, or not adapt, copyright law to
information goods, the current legislative response assumes that the public
welfare vision that real-space copyright law has sustained should remain
intact, notwithstanding the wealth of commercial, social, and political uses
of the Internet. Consequently, I challenged the concept of public welfare
as a static norm and the idea that progress is measured solely, or even
primarily, by the level of production of intellectual works without any
consideration of the extent and nature of uses that are potentiated.
Copyright scholars have strenuously advocated that application of
copyright in cyberspace should reflect the same balance the law currently
strives to maintain between public and private interests,41 5 and criticize the
fact that recent legislation threatens this balance. 416 I would suggest,
however, that this de minimis approach is just as problematic as the
pervasive "ratcheting up" of intellectual property rights; it fails to
recognize the need for the development of a robust public welfare vision
that will facilitate
and equip citizens for effective participation in
417
cyberspace.
There is no question that the Internet has engendered new challenges
and opportunities for those who provide informational content ("givers")
as well as new opportunities for those who would baldly misappropriate
such content ("takers"). Between these two groups, however, are those who
use information in a variety of productive ways. Identifying these groups
is, for practical purposes, a complex process, although for the most part
courts historically have done a good job distinguishing between (fair) users
and misappropriators. With the Internet, however, the complexity is
compounded as the question of authorship becomes intertwined with the
question of use. Every user in cyberspace is a potential author for copyright
purposes; in some of the multiple ways interaction takes place on the
Internet the distinction between authorship and use is virtually (no pun
415. See litman, supra note 400, at 275; see also Samuelson, supra note 12; DanThu Thi

Phan, Will FairUse Function on the Internet?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 169,216 (1998) (arguing that
fair use should play an important role in maintaining copyright equilibrium on the Internet).

416. See supranote 23 and accompanying text.
417. But see Elkin-Koren, supra note 216, at 345; Elkin-Koren, supranote 168; Keith Aoki,
Considering Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties: Liberalism, Libertarianism, National
Sovereignty, "Global" IntellectualProperty,and the Internet,5 IND. 1. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 443
(1998) (all offering a critique of the narrow conception of the socio-politics, power and economy
of intellectual property rights in the digital age, and in some cases, offering alternative visions for
the role of cyberspace in society).
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intended) nonexistent. Yet, the enormous potential of the Internet to
transform economic status418 and positively affect socioeconomic relations
is too great a welfare benefit to be constrained within traditional
measurements of the public/private balance. If stronger property rights are
justified (or necessary) because welfare gains from increased creativity are
jeopardized by the ease with which established rights may be undermined
by takers, then stronger countervailing user rights are also required to, at
least, maintain welfare benefits for users because new technology enables
owners to "lock up" information content. Recent copyright legislation has
granted owners the legal prerogative to do precisely this,4 19 while state
sanctioned private law regimes are being crafted to accomplish a similar
end.4 20 The Constitutional imperative to promote, and not merely sustain,
progress in the arts 42 1 thus requires stronger user rights on the Internet or,
at the very least, a different conception of copyright and its associated
rights. As copyright is strengthened and expanded to accommodate new
technologies, so should the model of public welfare be adjusted to account
for how new technology promotes or hinders access and use of copyrighted
works.
Several different shades of fair use are evident in the cases dealing with
new technology. Courts have sustained an enriching version of fair use
regarding the copyrightability of new technology. In cyberspace, however,
courts have simply applied the formalistic approach used in other fair use
cases, declining even to look at the new technology cases as a model. This
may be explained by the pervasive opinion, articulated in the NIl White
Paper, that digital technology is a radical threat to authors' rights that must
be preempted. Thus, the failure of a fair use defense is often a caricatured
injunctive remedy,4 2 premised on the assumption that digital technology
will do irreparable harm to authors and owners. How fair use is applied in
cyberspace will reflect a deliberate choice about how to regulate the
technology and how to regulate activity that stimulates valuable interaction
418. See Lehman Statement, supra note 414.
419. See, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1998)

(extending term of copyright protection for 20 years); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (prohibiting use of anticircumvention technology); No

Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (criminalizing forms of
on-line copyright "infringement"). A violation of the No Electronic Theft Act is punishable by

imprisonment or fine. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319(c) (1998).
420. See,

e.g.,

UCC

art.

2B,

§ 208

(Feb.

1,

1999

Draft),

available at

http:lwww.law.upenn.edulibrarylulclucc2b12b898.htm; Cohen, Jurisprudenceof Self-Help, supra
note 32 (arguing for a right of self-help for licensees and not licensors under the proposed regime
of art. 2B).

421. See generally UCC art. 2B, § 208 (Feb. 1, 1999 Draft), available at
http:llwww.law.upenn.edullibraryluletucc2b/2b898.htm.
422. See Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministries, Inc. 75 F.Supp. 2d 1290 (D.

Utah 1999).
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and discourse among users. Acuff-Rose applies fair use to new works,
irrespective of the commercial interest of the alleged infringers. 42 Its
progeny, however, threaten this conception of fair use. 42 As the Sega court
noted, courts "are free to consider the public benefit resulting from a
particular use." 425 The Sega court made the important point that "making
it impossible for others to compete runs counter to the statutory purpose"
of the Copyright statute.
Similar to the "locking" devices in Sega and Vault, clickwrap licenses,
automated rights management systems, and expansive copyright rights
preclude maximum uses of copyrighted work and subject users to the
largesse of the copyright owner, as does an expansive derivative rights
doctrine. The recent decisions in PrincetonUniversity PressandAmerican
Geophysical Union reinforce this structure. These developments should
cause us all to pause-and wonder-is technology in danger of us or are
we in danger of it? A technological world of cyber-vassals and cyber-lords
cannot be what the Founding Fathers envisioned as progress. After five
decades of political, social, and legal battles to dismantle embedded power
structures that foster inequality and marginalization, it is important that
neither Congress nor the courts succumb to pressure to recreate a virtual
world patterned after the one which we continue to struggle to transform.
Technology, contract, and copyright are imperfect arbiters of all the
competing interests at stake in cyberspace. A fair use doctrine that
considers the nature of the technological medium and that accounts for the
value of the alleged infringer's use of the work offers the prospect of
successful, if difficult, mediation of these interests in cyberspace. Fair use
offers welfare maximizing efficiencies in the allocation of the most
important resource of the global economy, namely, information.

423. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
424. See generallyLewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir.

1992); Sega Enter., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
425. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.

426. Id. at 1524.
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